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Creating Crimmigration
César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández*
The story of the United States has been one of welcoming
foreigners. It has also been a story of excluding foreigners. 1 Some
prospective immigrants have been deemed worthy of admission into
the country, while others have been turned back. 2 Some entered
without asking the government’s permission and were deported after
coming to the federal government’s attention, 3 while others were
given reprieve. 4 Still others have been allowed permission to enter
only to have that permission rescinded. 5 The bases of inclusion and
exclusion have shifted over time, but they have always turned on
markers of desirability or undesirability. 6
* Visiting Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law; Associate Professor,
Capital University Law School; Publisher, crImmigration.com. Many thanks to Ernesto
Hernandez-Lopez and Margaret B. Kwoka whose comments on earlier drafts greatly improved
this article.
1. See KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE “HUDDLED MASSES” MYTH: IMMIGRATION AND
CIVIL RIGHTS 2 (2004) [hereinafter JOHNSON, HUDDLED MASSES].
2. See generally Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 203(a)–(c), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1153(a)–(c) (2012) [hereinafter INA] (explaining the categories of noncitizens who may be
admitted as lawful permanent residents); § 204(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a) (detailing the process
for admitting noncitizens as lawful permanent residents); § 214(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1184
(authorizing admission of noncitizens as nonimmigrant visitors); § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)
(providing grounds of inadmissibility).
3. See generally INA § 237(a)(1)(A), (B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A), (B) (providing
grounds of deportation for noncitizens who were inadmissible at the time of entry or are
presently in violation of immigration law).
4. See State and Local Regulation of Unauthorized Immigrant Employment,
Developments in the Law: Immigrant Rights & Immigration Enforcement, 126 HARV. L. REV.
1565, 1613 (2013) (explaining that “[a]lmost 3 million undocumented immigrants received
lawful permanent resident status through IRCA’s amnesty program”); see also INA § 245(i), 8
U.S.C. § 1255(i) (authorizing adjustment of status for certain noncitizens who entered
without inspection).
5. See generally INA § 237(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (authorizing deportation of any
noncitizen who was admitted into the United States and then violated the conditions of their
stay through one of many enumerated actions).
6. See Pooja Gehi, Struggles from the Margins: Anti-Immigrant Legislation and the
Impact on Low-Income Transgender People of Color, 30 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 315, 316–17
(2009) (explaining that immigration law in the United States has been constructed “as a way
to keep in desirables and keep out undesirables,” then listing multiple categories of people who
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Beginning in the 1980s, however, the dominant distinguishing
characteristic between prospective immigrants who have been
welcomed and those who have been shunned has turned on criminal
activity. Convictions for a growing list of offenses result in removal—
the technical umbrella term for exclusion and deportation. 7
Sometimes commission—rather than conviction—of such an offense
is sufficient. 8 At the same time, immigration law enforcement has
increasingly adopted the securitized approach of criminal law
enforcement. 9 And criminal investigations involving certain crimes
related to immigration activity have borrowed many of the more lax
procedures traditionally used in the civil immigration law system. 10
These are the emblems of crimmigration law. 11 Together they
abandon framing noncitizens as contributing members of society on
the path to full political membership as citizens—“Americans in
waiting,” as Hiroshi Motomura termed the experience of earlier
generations of immigrants to the United States. 12 Instead, the
procedural and substantive law that comprises crimmigration law has
reimagined noncitizens as criminal deviants and security risks. 13 They
are people to be feared, 14 their risk assessed, 15 and the threat they

have been negatively impacted by immigration law); Mary Holper, Deportation for a Sin: Why
Moral Turpitude is Void for Vagueness, 90 NEB. L. REV. 647, 650 (2012) (quoting DANIEL
KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION 115 (2007) (explaining that a congressional panel in
1891 “recommended new immigration laws to ‘separate the desirable from the undesirable
immigrants’”)); Gerald L. Neuman, Administrative Law: Immigration, Amnesty, and the Rule
of Law, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1335, 1335 (2008) (noting that in the aftermath of the Civil
War, Congress enacted legislation to exclude immigrants considered “undesirable”); see also
Eric A. Posner, The Institutional Structure of Immigration Law, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 289, 295
(2013) (noting that “immigration law . . . can be understood . . . as a screening device for
distinguishing desirable migrants and undesirable migrants”).
7. See INA § 212(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2); INA § 237(a)(2), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2). “Removal” proceedings encompass deportation and inadmissibility. INA
§ 240(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a).
8. See INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i).
9. See infra Part II.A–B.
10. See infra Part II.C–D.
11. See Juliet P. Stumpf, Introduction to SOCIAL CONTROL AND JUSTICE:
CRIMMIGRATION IN THE AGE OF FEAR 7, 7 (Maria João Guia et al. eds., 2013).
12. See generally HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 132 (2006).
13. See Stumpf, supra note 11, at 10.
14. See id. at 11.
15. See Robert Koulish, Entering the Risk Society: A Contested Terrain for Immigration
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pose managed. 16 Crime control and migration control have become
so intertwined that they have ceased to be distinct processes or to
target distinct acts, for both noncitizens and individuals suspected of
being noncitizens. 17
Scholars from a variety of disciplines have recently begun to
identify crimmigration law’s core features and map its contours. 18
None, however, have attempted to discern why crimmigration law
developed when it did. Animosity toward noncitizens has been a
feature of the United States’ conflicted view of newcomers since long
before the colonies split from Britain. 19 Why, then, did
crimmigration law not develop earlier? This Article sets out to answer
that question.
Crimmigration law, this Article explains, developed in the closing
decades of the twentieth century due to a shift in the perception of
criminal law’s proper place in society combined with a reinvigorated
fear of noncitizens that occurred in the aftermath of the civil rights
movement. Specifically, in the aftermath of the civil rights
movement, overt racism became culturally disdained and facially
racist laws impermissible. Derision of people of color, however, did
not cease. Instead, it found a new outlet in facially neutral rhetoric
and laws penalizing criminal activity. When immigration became a
national political concern for the first time since the civil rights era,
policymakers turned to criminal law and procedure to do what race
had done in earlier generations: sort the desirable newcomers from
the undesirable.

Enforcement, in SOCIAL CONTROL AND JUSTICE: CRIMMIGRATION IN THE AGE OF FEAR,
supra note 11, at 61, 83.
16. See id.; see also Jennifer M. Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135, 137 (2009) (“In recent years . . . the U.S. government has
increasingly handled migration control through the criminal justice system.”).
17. See Joanne van der Leun & Maartje van der Woude, A Reflection on Crimmigration
in the Netherlands: On the Cultural Security Complex and the Impact of Framing, in SOCIAL
CONTROL AND JUSTICE: CRIMMIGRATION IN THE AGE OF FEAR, supra note 11, at 41, 43.
18. See generally SOCIAL CONTROL AND JUSTICE: CRIMMIGRATION IN THE AGE OF
FEAR, supra note 11 (presenting scholarly work on crimmigration from a variety of disciplines).
19. See generally KANSTROOM, supra note 6, at 21–90 (describing various forms of
exclusion and deportation during the colonial era); see also ELIZABETH HULL, WITHOUT
JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF ALIENS 9 (1985) (discussing nativism
during the founding era).

1459

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1/27/2014 11:03 AM

2013

To unravel this proposition, this Article proceeds in three parts.
Part I reviews the long historical derision of noncitizens, which
indicates that immigrants have been subjected to stigma,
discrimination, and violence throughout the nation’s history. Yet it
was only at the end of the twentieth century that immigration law
became so enmeshed with criminal law that the “penalty of
deportation” became “‘most difficult’ to divorce . . . from the
conviction,” as the Supreme Court concluded in 2010. 20 What
changed, Part II explains, is the willingness with which United States
law and society turned to penal norms to address social phenomena
deemed problematic. The “war on crime” and, in particular, its
sharp-edged progeny, the “war on drugs,” created the societal
perception that crime lurks everywhere. In response, police officers
became an omnipresent feature of community life, especially in
urban areas. Concomitantly, imprisonment became a characteristic of
late twentieth century United States law, culture, and social
organization. Legislators at the federal, state, and local level enacted
innumerable statutes expanding the scope of confinement. As a
result, the United States experienced an imprisonment boom unlike
any seen in its history. Jail and prison populations skyrocketed; so
too did the number of people under other types of correctional
supervision, such as probation and parole. For many people,
encounters with the police and imprisonment became expected—
almost inevitable—stages of life.
Criminal law and procedure trends in the 1980s might have
remained largely irrelevant to noncitizens had it not been for a
simultaneously reignited concern about immigration that developed in
the 1970s and 1980s. As Part III explains, unauthorized immigration
began to grow steadily after passage of the Hart-Celler Act of 1965,
which imposed a cap on the number of visas available per country,
including even countries with deep ties to the United States.21 Almost
from the beginning, demand for visas from Mexican citizens greatly
exceeded supply. Within a few years, the large numbers of Haitians,
Cubans, and Central Americans who flocked to the United States
compounded the concern about the federal government’s regulation of

20. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366 (2010).
21. Immigration Act of 1965 (Hart-Celler Act), Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 2, 79 Stat. 911, 911.
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immigration. By the mid-1980s, immigration reentered the political
arena where prominent policymakers associated the new round of arriving
noncitizens, racialized as not white, with lawbreaking that endangered the
nation’s security.
Unlike earlier episodes of widespread concern about
immigration, legislators operating in the aftermath of the previous
decades’ civil rights movements could not resort to the simple
vilifications that motivated so much of immigration law’s history.
Instead, as Part IV illustrates, the national government began to turn
to the criminal policing practices that had taken hold at the state and
federal levels with devastating consequences for people of color—in
particular a reduction in judicial discretion and a newfound
willingness to tap its authority to imprison. Though Congress and
President Reagan famously enacted a broad amnesty provision
regularizing the status of millions of people already present in the
United States, 22 the federal government also began its long march
toward interweaving criminal law and immigration law. It began, in
other words, to create crimmigration law.
I. A HISTORY OF ANIMUS
Animus towards immigrants has long run through the United
States’ cultural and political institutions. 23 Although both cultural
animus and legal sanctions have often focused on particular ethnic
groups, immigrants with criminal histories have long been targeted
for especially harsh treatment. Nonetheless, history demonstrates
that animus towards immigrants in general, and immigrants with
criminal records in particular, was alone insufficient to cause
immigration, criminal laws, and law enforcement to comingle in
pursuit of common goals. Rather, the crimmigration regime is a
recent phenomenon.
Ethnicity-based animus long pre-dates the country’s founding.
Benjamin Franklin famously asked why Germans should “‘be
suffered to swarm into our Settlements, and by herding together
establish their Language and Manners to the Exclusion of ours. Why
22. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, §§ 201–03,
100 Stat. 3359, 3394, 3405.
23. See JUAN F. PEREA, Introduction to IMMIGRANTS OUT!: THE NEW NATIVISM AND
THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 1–2 (Juan F. Perea ed., 1997).
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should Pennsylvania, founded by the English, become a Colony of
Aliens, who will shortly be so numerous as to Germanize us, instead
of our Anglifying them [sic].’” 24 Franklin, of course, was not alone
among the members of his generation in his antipathy towards
foreigners. The “first major deportation of European settlers in the
New World,” writes Daniel Kanstroom, began in 1755 when officials
in Nova Scotia loyal to the British drove French colonists known as
Acadians out of the territory and ordered their buildings burned. 25
Distaste for newcomers based on ethnicity, of course, did not
subside with time. Rather, foreigners have been derided in almost
every period of the nation’s history. 26 The Chinese were explicitly
excluded by statute in 1882, while in 1907 Henry James described a
“swarming . . . Jewry that had burst all bounds” in New York. 27
Italians were later described as similar to Chinese or, more
commonly, to blacks—neither comparison meant as flattery—and
subjected to an array of discrimination. 28 Years later, Mexicans,
including United States citizens of Mexican descent, were welcomed
as temporary laborers during a labor shortage, only to experience
mass deportation when they were no longer wanted. 29
The anti-immigrant strain that stretches across the nation’s
history is not solely focused on immigrants’ ethnicity. Instead, there
is also a long tradition of directing special antagonism toward
foreigners who violate criminal laws either domestically or abroad.
For instance, in the 1750s, Franklin lodged special opprobrium
against convicts sent to the colonies’ shores by European nations, a
common alternative to a death sentence for hundreds of crimes: 30
“‘In what can Britain show a more Sovereign Contempt for us, than
by emptying their Jails into our Settlements; unless they would

24. John B. Frantz, Franklin and the Pennsylvania Germans, 65 PA. HIST. J. MIDATLANTIC STUD. 21, 23 (1998) (citing THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 234 (Leonard
W. Labaree et al. eds., 1969)).
25. KANSTROOM, supra note 6, at 44.
26. See HULL, supra note 19, at 9; JOHNSON, HUDDLED MASSES, supra note 1, at 7.
27. HENRY JAMES, THE AMERICAN SCENE 127 (1907).
28. DAVID R. ROEDIGER, WORKING TOWARD WHITENESS: HOW AMERICA’S
IMMIGRANTS BECAME WHITE 46–47 (2005).
29. IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 27–28
(2006).
30. See KANSTROOM, supra note 6, at 39–41.

1462

DO NOT DELETE

1457

1/27/2014 11:03 AM

Creating Crimmigration

likewise empty their Jakes [privies] on our Tables?’” 31 Convicted
foreigners, Franklin thought, were little better than feces. A
resolution enacted by the Continental Congress some thirty years
later suggests that the prevailing opinion had not changed. In 1788,
the Continental Congress “unanimously adopted a resolution,
recommending to the several states to pass proper laws for
preventing the transportation of convicted malefactors from foreign
countries into the United States.” 32 By 1791, at least six states had
done so. 33 Eventually Britain turned its attention to Australia as a
destination for its convicts, but rumors persisted as late as 1874 that
Britain continued its old practice of sending lawbreakers to the
United States. 34
During the late nineteenth century, Congress began enacting
legislation that excluded individuals who had been convicted of
specified types of crimes from entering the United States. In 1875,
the federal government’s first modern foray into regulating
immigration—the same act that launched the now-dominant view
that immigration regulation is the exclusive province of the federal
government—included a prohibition against the entry of convicted
felons. 35 The infamous Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 criminalized
helping Chinese enter without authorization and fraudulently
obtaining the certificates of residence required for Chinese to live
here. 36 Less than a decade later, in 1891, Congress enacted a
provision that remains a central part of immigration law today and is
a constant source of headaches for immigration attorneys—the basis
of exclusion for having committed a crime involving moral

31. DAVID WALDSTREICHER, RUNAWAY AMERICA: BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, SLAVERY,
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 140 (2004). The Virginia Gazette displayed similar
sentiments in a 1751 article: “When we see our Papers fill’d continually with accounts of the
most audacious Robberies, the most Cruel Murders, and infinite other Villanies perpetrated by
Convicts transported from Europe, what melancholy, what terrible Reflections must it
occasion!” KANSTROOM, supra note 6, at 41.
32. New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102, 112 (1837).
33. Id. at 112–13.
34. Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law, (1776–1875),
93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1842, 1842 n.41 (1993).
35. Act of March 3, 1875 (Page Act), ch. 141, § 5, 18 Stat. 477.
36. Act of May 6, 1882 (Chinese Exclusion Act), ch. 126, §§ 7, 11, 22 Stat. 58, 60–61,
repealed by Chinese Exclusion Repeal Act of 1943, ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600.
AND THE
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turpitude. 37 That same public law authorized the deportation of
anyone who entered the country in violation of immigration law—
but, importantly, limited this authority to the year after the
noncitizen’s arrival in the United States—creating what Kanstroom
refers to as the “first general deportation law since the Alien and
Sedition Acts” of 1798. 38 It was not until the Immigration Act of
1917 was enacted, however, that commission of a crime involving
moral turpitude would explicitly become a basis for deportation. 39
Five years later, Congress added narcotics offenses to the list of
reasons justifying deportation. 40
As criminal histories became an increasingly common method of
distinguishing between excludable and admissible noncitizens,
criminal law also began to be used as a method of regulating
immigration. Aside from banning entry of most Chinese citizens and
descendants, the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1892 imposed a year of
hard labor on any Chinese person found to be unlawfully present in
the United States. 41 No judicial process was required before
imprisonment; a determination by an immigration official, an officer
of the Executive Branch, sufficed. 42 However, four years later the
Supreme Court in Wong Wing v. United States concluded that
Congress, in enacting this provision, overstepped its authority. While
Congress could ban the Chinese, the Court explained, it could not
turn to criminal punishments without “provid[ing] for a judicial trial
to establish the guilt of the accused.” 43 Importantly, Wong Wing
recognized the government’s power to impose criminal penalties so
long as it abided by constitutional limitations on its power to
criminalize. “[W]e think it would be plainly competent for

37. See Immigration Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 1, 26 Stat. 1084, 1084.
38. KANSTROOM, supra note 6, at 115.
39. Holper, supra note 6, at 650. The 1917 Act authorized deportation for having
committed a crime involving moral turpitude within five years of entry into the United States if
the sentence received was for a year or more, or for having committed two crimes involving
moral turpitude at any time after entry. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, §§ 3, 19, 39 Stat. 874.
40. Act of May 26, 1922, ch. 202, Pub. L. No. 227, 42 Stat. 596; see Matter of V-----,
1 I. & N. Dec. 293, 295 (Bd. Immgr. .Appeals 1942) (holding that such a conviction could
also serve as a basis for exclusion).
41. Geary Act of 1892, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25; see BILL ONG HING, MAKING AND
REMAKING ASIAN AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY 1850–1990, 23–24 (1993).
42. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235–36 (1896).
43. Id. at 237.
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[C]ongress to declare the act of an alien in remaining unlawfully
within the United States to be an offense punishable by fine or
imprisonment,” it explained, “if such offense were to be established
by a judicial trial.” 44 Thirty-three years later Congress exploited that
statement when, in 1929, it criminalized unauthorized entry into the
United States with a penalty of up to a year imprisonment and a
maximum fine of $1,000. 45 This same Act imposed a maximum of
two years imprisonment, a federal felony, on people who entered
without authorization after having been previously deported. 46
Despite the development of a legislative scheme that relied on
interactions with the criminal justice system and a parallel body of
substantive criminal offenses punishing forms of immigration,
criminal law and immigration law largely remained distinct bodies of
law through the early 1980s. To begin, none of these punitive
legislative authorizations were utilized all that much. The bulk of
people who were excluded or deported suffered that fate because
they lacked permission to be in the United States. 47 Perhaps they
entered without permission, or perhaps they violated some condition
of their authorization. In all but a small number of situations, the
principal motivating factor for their removal was not involvement in
criminal activity. 48 Likewise, the immigration-related federal crimes
did not play a prominent role in the lives of most noncitizens or the
immigration law enforcement agendas of most presidential

44. Id. at 235.
45. Act of March 4, 1929, ch. 690, § 2, 45 Stat. 1551, 1551.
46. Id. § 1.
47. According to the statistical data published by the INS, 633,918 people were
excluded from the United States between 1892 and 1984. U.S. IMMIGRATION &
NATURALIZATION SERV., 1996 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE 175 tbl.60 (1997) [hereinafter INS 1996 YEARBOOK]. Of these,
192,545 were excluded because they lacked the proper documents, and 219,421 because they
were deemed likely to become a public charge. Id. Similarly, 812,915 people were deported
between 1908 and 1980. Id. at 183 tbl.65. Of these, 334,889 were deported because they
entered without inspection or by relying on false statements; 154,896 due to having entered
without the proper documents; and another 124,465 because they failed to comply with the
conditions of their authorized presence. Id.
48. Of the 633,918 people excluded from the United States between 1892 and 1984,
only 14,287 were excluded due to a criminal or narcotics violation. Id. at 175 tbl.60. Similarly,
of the 812,915 people deported between 1908 and 1980, only 48,330 were deported due to a
criminal violation and another 8,339 for a narcotics violation. Id. at 183 tbl.65.
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administrations. Neither illegal entry nor illegal reentry was
prosecuted frequently. 49
Furthermore, criminal policing norms and immigration law
enforcement norms remained distinct. Use of firearms and large-scale
reliance on detention, for example, were largely unheard of in the
immigration law enforcement context. Employees of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”), the federal
government agency charged with enforcing immigration laws for
much of the twentieth century, were not even authorized to carry
firearms until 1990. 50 Detention pending a decision about whether a
person could remain in the United States was unquestionably the
exception. 51 For most of the twentieth century, few noncitizens
subjected to immigration proceedings saw the inside of an
immigration detention center. Indeed, the INS lacked the capacity to
detain large numbers of noncitizens even if it wanted to do so.
For all the hostility toward noncitizens that has appeared
throughout United States’ history, the immigration law apparatus
remained distinct from the penal system. Criminal law maintained a
focus on the traditional conduct associated with criminality—offenses
against property and people. Immigration law, meanwhile, remained
firmly encamped within civil law, sorting through the administrative
matter of who was authorized to be in the country. People suspected
of violating immigration law were accordingly processed through the
civil immigration court system, an administrative unit first of the
Department of Labor, then the Department of Justice. Within this
system, they were not entitled to appointed counsel, as the Sixth
Amendment requires in criminal prosecutions, and though they were
protected by the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, it is a due

49. As late as 1993, federal prosecutors lodged only 2,487 criminal cases where the lead
charge was an immigration offense. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUS.
1997 ANNUAL REPORT 188 tbl.D-2 [hereinafter JUDICIAL BUS. 1997 REPORT].
50. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 503, 104 Stat. 4978, 5048–49.
51. In 1954, the INS abandoned its policy of detaining immigrants “except in rare cases
where an alien was considered likely to ‘abscond’ or to pose a danger to the nation or
community.” MARK DOW, AMERICAN GULAG: INSIDE U.S. IMMIGRATION PRISONS 6–7
(2004). The agency’s detention statistics indicate that few people were categorized as such: the
INS detained only 2370 people, on average, in 1973. Id. at 8. That figure increased to 4062
by 1980, though the INS thought of this as too low given its newly created plans to detain
hundreds of thousands of suspected unauthorized noncitizens. Id.
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process regime mitigated by Congress and the President’s power to
dictate admission and the conditions of a noncitizen’s stay. 52
II. IDENTIFYING CRIMMIGRATION
The convergence of criminal and immigration law was therefore
neither obvious nor necessary. Beginning in the 1980s and blooming
in the 1990s and the early years of the twenty-first century, criminal
law and immigration law lost much of their separate identities. In
many respects, wrote Juliet Stumpf in her foundational article
examining crimmigration law, the criminalization of immigration law
“has created parallel systems in which immigration law and the
criminal justice system are merely nominally separate.” 53 This, she
added, has meant that “aliens [have] become synonymous with
criminals.” 54 Examining federal initiatives designed to process vast
numbers of immigration-related criminal prosecutions of
noncitizens, Jennifer Chacón similarly argues that “we are also
witnessing the importation of the relaxed procedural norms of civil
immigration proceedings into the criminal realm.” 55
As Stumpf’s and Chacón’s descriptions suggest, crimmigration
might be defined as “the intertwinement of crime control and
migration control.” 56 Starting in the 1980s, this “intertwinement” has
rapidly expanded in the United States and changed the procedure and
substance of criminal and immigration law such that as a person
becomes entangled in one, she suffers increasingly adverse
consequences in the other. First, involvement in criminal activity now
frequently leads to “presumptively mandatory” removal, as the
Supreme Court recognized in Padilla v. Kentucky. 57 Second, the
52. See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950)
(“Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied
entry is concerned.”); Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1903) (extending Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause protections to deportation proceedings); Peter L. Markowitz,
Deportation is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299, 1302 (2011) (“[A]s a result of the civil
label currently applied to deportation proceedings, poor immigrants have no right to
appointed counsel despite the notorious complexity of immigration law . . . .”).
53. Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power,
56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 376 (2006).
54. Id. at 419.
55. Chacón, supra note 16, at 137.
56. Van der Leun & Van der Woude, supra note 17, at 41, 43.
57. 559 U.S. 356, 369 (2010).
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federal government and its subfederal counterparts have taken to
punishing immigration-related activities through their respective penal
systems. These developments have been made possible because the
procedural laxity of civil immigration proceedings now appears in
criminal proceedings involving immigration activity. Meanwhile, the
policing norms of the criminal justice system have become emblematic
of modern immigration policing, while trends long visible in
immigration law policing have begun to appear in traditional criminal
policing.
A. Expanding Crime-Based Removal
During the 1980s and 1990s, Congress, with the support of
multiple presidential administrations, drastically increased the types
of criminal conduct that could result in removal. In addition to the
decades-old penalty available for conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, Congress expanded the narcotics conviction basis of
deportation to include any controlled-substances offense, whether
enacted by a state, the federal government, or a foreign country. 58
Moreover, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 added the “aggravated
felony” into the immigration law lexicon and provided that a
conviction for an aggravated felony would result in deportation. 59 At
the time, only three crimes were considered aggravated felonies:
murder, illicit trafficking in firearms, and drug trafficking. 60 Two
years later, the Immigration Act of 1990 expanded the definition of
“aggravated felony” by adding money laundering and crimes of
violence, for which a term of imprisonment of at least five years was
imposed. 61 In a separate provision, the 1990 Act authorized
deportation for attempting to violate a controlled-substances

58. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1751, 100 Stat. 3207
(amending INA § 212(a)(23), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(23) (2012)) (replacing the provision
authorizing deportation on the basis of a conviction for an “‘addiction-sustaining opiate’” with
a provision referencing any conviction involving a controlled substance under a state, federal,
or foreign country’s law); see INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). Controlledsubstances offenses and crimes involving moral turpitude can also result in exclusion from the
United States. Id. § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), (II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), (II).
59. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7342, 102 Stat. 4181,
4469–70 (amending INA § 101(a), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)).
60. Id.
61. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 501, 104 Stat. 4978, 5048.
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offense. 62 Two well-known public laws enacted in 1996, the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA),
added a host of offenses to the aggravated felony definition. AEDPA
added offenses such as gambling, transportation related to
prostitution, human smuggling, certain passport fraud convictions,
perjury, failure to appear for a judicial proceeding, and more. 63 Five
months later, IIRIRA added the offenses of rape and sexual abuse of
a minor, reduced the money-laundering threshold from $100,000 to
$10,000, and lowered the fraud and tax evasion amount from
$200,000 to $10,000, among other changes. 64 IIRIRA also
authorized the federal government to remove a person convicted of
an aggravated felony and sentenced to at least five years
imprisonment, even to a country where her “life or freedom would
be threatened . . . because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 65
Today, the aggravated felony definition spans twenty-one
subsections, some of which include their own subsections. 66
Options for relief from removal are few (and diminishing over
time) and eligibility is limited. In 1990, Congress repealed the
judicial recommendation against deportation, a statutory power that
criminal sentencing judges had wielded for almost a half century to
prevent deportation on the basis of a particular conviction. 67 That
same year, legislators began to narrow the eligibility criteria for an
even older form of relief from removal that immigration judges had
at their disposal—relief under former § 212(c) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (“INA”). 68 Six years later Congress repealed

62. Id. § 508.
63. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§ 440, 110 Stat. 1214, 1276–77.
64. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, § 321, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–627 (amending INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)).
65. Id. § 305 (amending INA § 241, 8 U.S.C. § 1251).
66. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)–(U).
67. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 505, 104 Stat. 4978, 5050.
68. Id. § 511; see INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 294–97 (2001) (“In 1990, Congress
amended § 212(c) to preclude from discretionary relief anyone convicted of an aggravated
felony who had served a term of imprisonment of at least five years.”).
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§ 212(c) altogether. 69 In its place, it enacted cancellation of
removal. 70 Though cancellation of removal is the most charitable
form of relief from removal that exists in the current version of the
INA, the eligibility criteria are significantly narrower than they were
under § 212(c). Meanwhile, in 1994, criminal court judges received
the power to order deportation as part of the sentencing process. 71
Immigration officials were quick to tap their emerging powers to
target convicted noncitizens. As a point of comparison, in the decade
from 1971 to 1980, the INS deported 6150 people because of a
criminal or narcotics violation. 72 Though the numbers began to
increase, the pattern did not change significantly for the next several
years. 73 In 1986, when crimmigration law was only starting to
blossom, the INS reported removing 1978 people “for criminal and
narcotics violations,” a mere 4% of the total number removed that
year. 74 Two years later, it removed 5956 people for these reasons, a
significant 23.1% of the total number of people removed that year. 75
By 1992, it reported removing 24,219 people (55.6%), and in 1996,
it reported removing 36,909 (53.8%) for criminal or drug
violations. 76
For most noncitizens convicted of one of these offenses,
entering the U.S. Immigration and Custom Enforcement’s
(“ICE”) radar is likely to result in removal. According to an
analysis by Hiroshi Motomura, for example, of the roughly
600,000 deportable noncitizens arrested by ICE or the U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) agency—the two
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) units primarily
responsible for enforcing immigration law—in fiscal year 2009,
somewhere between 400,000 and 600,000 were prosecuted,

69. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, § 304(b) (repealing
INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c)).
70. Id.
71. Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103416, § 224(a), 108 Stat. 4305, 4322 (amending INA § 242A, 8 U.S.C. § 1252a) (recodified
at INA § 238(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c)(a)).
72. INS 1996 YEARBOOK, supra note 47, at 183 tbl.65 (1997).
73. Id. at 183 tbl.66.
74. Id. at 170–71.
75. Id. at 171.
76. Id.
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adjudicated, and ordered to depart the United States. 77 Once a
noncitizen who has violated immigration law comes into the
hands of an immigration officer the likelihood of being allowed to
remain in the country is slim. 78
B. Criminalizing Migration
While Congress was busy expanding the range of crimes that
could result in removal, it also became more willing to use
traditional criminal law to punish immigration law violations. In the
1980s and 1990s, Congress enacted a spate of new immigrationrelated crimes and increased the penalties for existing crimes. When
it added the “aggravated felony” category of removable offense to
immigration law in 1988, for example, it raised the maximum term
of imprisonment to fifteen years if a noncitizen who entered the
United States without authorization had previously been convicted
of an aggravated felony. 79 Later, the maximum was again raised;
this time to twenty years imprisonment, where it remains today. 80
Also during the 1980s, the Immigration Reform and Control Act
of 1986, best known for its amnesty provisions, criminalized certain
immigration conduct and stiffened penalties for existing
immigration crimes. One section, for example, criminalized hiring
unauthorized workers, with the possibility of six months
imprisonment. 81 Another section authorized up to five years
imprisonment for bringing people into the United States
clandestinely, 82 while a third provision enhanced the penalty for
possession or use of a false immigration document. 83 Four days
later, the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments Act
77. Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion That Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement,
State and Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1841 fig.2
(2011).
78. See id. at 1836 (“[T]he arrest stage has been when government officers . . . exercise
the discretion that matters.”); id. at 1842 (“[T]he immigration enforcement discretion
exercised at the arrest stage has been the discretion that matters.”).
79. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7345, 102 Stat. 4181,
4469–70.
80. INA § 276(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) (2012).
81. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 101, 100
Stat. 3359, 3360 (codified at INA § 274A, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a).
82. Id. § 112 (amending INA § 274(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1324).
83. Id. § 103 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1546).
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criminalized “knowingly enter[ing] into a marriage for the purpose
of evading any provision of the immigration laws,” and imposed a
maximum of five years imprisonment. 84 A decade later, Congress
added a criminal penalty of as much as five years for failure to
disclose having falsely prepared an application for immigration
benefits and added a repeat offender provision that could raise the
penalty to fifteen years. 85
With time, immigration offenses began to fill a larger portion of
the federal criminal docket. In 1993, for example, 2487 federal
criminal prosecutions were filed in which an immigration crime was
the lead charge, making these cases 5.4% of the nation’s criminal
docket. 86 By 1997, the 6677 immigration law prosecutions made up
13.4% of the federal criminal docket. 87 In 2001, the first year for
which the federal courts reported the number of prosecutions for
illegal entry and illegal reentry, immigration offenses constituted
18.2% of the docket. 88 Illegal entry and illegal reentry prosecutions
alone made up 14.9% of all criminal cases initiated by federal
prosecutors that year. 89
This steady expansion sped up during the administration of
President George W. Bush, and it continues under President Obama.
In January 2013 alone, 7557 defendants were charged with illegal
entry before federal magistrates and another 1557 with illegal reentry
before district court judges. 90 More telling is the jump in illegal entry
and illegal reentry prosecutions that occurred in 2008 and has yet to
subside. In 2007, federal prosecutors filed 31,639 criminal cases in
84. Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, § 2(d),
100 Stat. 3537, 3542.
85. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104208, § 213, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-571 (codified at INA § 274C(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e) (2012)).
86. See JUDICIAL BUS. 1997 REPORT, supra note 49, 198 tbl.D-2. There were 45,902
federal criminal cases filed in 1993. Id. at 196 tbl.D-2.
87. See id. at 198. There were 49,655 federal criminal cases filed in 1997. Id. at 196
tbl.D-2.
88. In 2001, 11,288 of 62,134 criminal cases filed featured an immigration offense as
the lead charge. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2005 ANNUAL
REPORT 11, 225, 227 tbl.D-2.
89. See id. at 227 tbl.D-2. There were 2036 illegal entry cases and 7203 illegal reentry
cases filed in 2001.
90. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Immigration Prosecutions for January
2013, TRAC IMMIGRATION (Mar. 5, 2013), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/bulletins/
immigration/monthlyjan13/fil/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2013).
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which illegal entry (13,960) or illegal reentry (17,679) was the lead
charge. 91 The next year they filed 49,663 illegal entry cases and
21,320 illegal reentry cases for a total of 70,983 cases. 92 Case filings
for these two offenses continued to increase, topping off at 84,301
in 2009, but remaining well above pre-2008 levels: 79,524 in 2010
and 71,644 in 2011. 93 In 2004, immigration offenses for the first
time became the single largest type of crime prosecuted in federal
courts. 94 As recently as 2011 there were more federal criminal
immigration cases lodged each year than prosecutions for violent
crimes, drug offenses, or any other type of federal crime. 95
Meanwhile, the states have also attempted to penalize
immigration law violations. In a well-documented trend that is
unlike anything seen since at least the late 1800s when states were
last heavily involved in regulating immigration, state legislators
introduced well over a thousand immigration-related proposals each
year between 2007 and 2011, and another 983 proposals in 2012. 96
91. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Lead Charges for Criminal
IMMIGRATION,
Immigration
Prosecutions:
FY
1986-FY
2011,
TRAC
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/ 251/include/imm_charges.html (last visited Sept.
15, 2013).
92. Id.
93. Id. According to TRAC, there were 54,175 and 30,126 cases in which illegal entry
and illegal reentry, respectively, were the lead charges in 2009; 43,688 and 35,836 for illegal
entry and illegal reentry, respectively, in 2010; and a projected 34,540 and 37,104 for illegal
entry and illegal reentry, respectively, in 2011. Id.
94. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Immigration Enforcement: New
Findings, TRAC DHS (Aug. 24, 2005), http://trac.syr.edu/tracins/latest/current/ (“[I]n
FY 2004, immigration matters now represent the single largest group of all federal
prosecutions . . . .”).
95. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Comparing Program Areas: Federal
DHS,
Judicial
District:
U.S.,
TRAC
http://trac.syr.edu/tracins/highlights/v04/dhsallprog_fil. html (last visited Sept. 15, 2013)
(explaining that 32.5% of prosecutions in fiscal year 2004 were for immigration offenses while
the next highest category, narcotics/drugs, came in at 26.6%). Data from federal district courts
alone indicate that in 2011 there were 28,435 immigration prosecutions lodged, eclipsing drug
offenses, the second most prosecuted category, which came in at 16,109 prosecutions. Table
D-2: Cases: U.S. District Courts—Criminal Cases Commenced, by Offense, During the 12-Month
COURTS,
Periods
Ending
March
31,
2007
Through
2011,
U.S.
http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/Federal
JudicialCaseloadStatistics/2011/tables/D02CMar11.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2013).
96. 2012 Immigration-Related Laws and Resolutions in the States (Jan. 1-Dec. 31, 2012),
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES tbl.1 (Jan. 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/issuesresearch/immig/2012-immigration-related-laws-jan-december-2012.aspx (last visited Sept.
15, 2013). According to the NCSL report, in 2007, 1562 proposals were introduced and 240
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A total of 1229 of these proposals were enacted. 97 Though the
enacted laws run the gamut of immigration legislation—everything
from access to education to voting—102 of the laws enacted from
2010 to 2012 address state and local law enforcement officials’
involvement in regulating immigration. 98 Arizona, Alabama, and
Georgia’s wide-ranging laws made headlines, with Arizona’s Senate
Bill 1070—unflatteringly described as the “show me your papers”
law by opponents—making its way to the Supreme Court. 99 Aside
from these high-profile enactments, states and localities have become
accustomed to using criminal prosecutions to target noncitizens.
Some prosecutors have adopted policies in which they tailor criminal
prosecutions to increase the likelihood that the criminal process
results in removal. 100 Some states have restricted bail for criminal
defendants thought to lack authorization to be present in the United
States. 101 In Arizona, unauthorized migrants are sometimes
prosecuted for smuggling themselves under the state’s human
smuggling offense. 102 One New Hampshire police chief even sought,
ultimately without success, to use the state’s criminal trespass offense
to punish unauthorized individuals present in the state. 103

enacted; in 2008, 1305 introduced and 206 enacted; in 2009, 1500 introduced and 222
enacted; in 2010, 1400 enacted and 208 enacted; in 2011, 1607 introduced and 197 enacted;
and in 2012, 983 introduced and 156 enacted. Id.
97. See id.
98. Id. at tbl.2. NCSL explains that “[t]hese laws address a wide range of law
enforcement areas, from firearm possession and domestic violence to drug manufacturing and
trafficking.” Id.
99. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
100. See Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in
Local Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1170–80 (2013).
101. See, e.g., Ingrid V. Eagly, Local Immigration Prosecution: A Study of Arizona Before
SB 1070, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1749, 1762–63 (2011) (discussing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 133906 (2010) and ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 22) [hereinafter Eagly, Immigration Prosecution];
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-11-105(c), -118(e) (2013).
102. See Eagly, Local Immigration Prosecution, supra note 101, at 1752–53.
103. Pam Belluck, Novel Tack on Illegal Immigrants: Trespass Charges, N.Y. TIMES, July
13, 2005, at A14.
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C. Bringing Civil Immigration Law Procedures to Criminal Policing
and Prosecutions
A third trend emblematic of the convergence of criminal law
and immigration law also appears in criminal law enforcement
practices and judicial proceedings: dispensing with certain
procedural protections traditionally afforded criminal defendants
when immigration-related activity forms the basis for the criminal
prosecution. In deviating from traditional criminal practice, these
proceedings seem to “borrow” lesser procedural protections from
immigration courts, which are not subject to the panoply of
constitutional limitations on the government’s power to punish
that are embodied in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments
because they concern only civil immigration matters.
Modern policing practices have frequently conflated immigration
and criminal law enforcement goals while relying on lax
interpretations of the Fourth Amendment that are rooted in civil
immigration law. For almost thirty years, the Supreme Court has
limited the Fourth Amendment’s reach into civil immigration
proceedings. 104 Relying on this precedent, the Eighth Circuit, for
example, permitted the use of evidence obtained by police officers
investigating traditional criminal offenses to be used against
noncitizens in immigration proceedings. 105 In another decision, the
Supreme Court held that noncitizens were not “seized” for Fourth
Amendment purposes even though INS agents filled their workplace
and stood in front of doors and windows as other agents moved
across the factory floor speaking to each individual. 106 Similarly, the
Fourth Circuit held that a West Virginia sheriff’s deputy did not
violate the Fourth Amendment even though he took time to call
ICE during a routine automobile stop for a speeding infraction. 107

104. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1045–50 (1984) (holding that the
exclusionary rule generally does not apply in immigration proceedings).
105. See Puc-Ruiz v. Holder, 629 F.3d 771, 775–80 (8th Cir. 2010) (allowing the use of
identification information obtained by police without probable cause or an applicable Fourth
Amendment exception).
106. See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217–19 (1984).
107. See United States v. Guijon-Ortiz, 660 F.3d 757, 770 (4th Cir. 2011).
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Some ICE agents have taken this relaxed view of the Fourth
Amendment to heart. The ICE officer in charge of a raid of homes
on Long Island ostensibly targeting suspected gang members, for
example, explained his understanding of the Fourth Amendment’s
warrant requirement as follows: “We didn’t have warrants . . . . We
don’t need warrants to make the arrests. These are illegal
immigrants.” 108 In an effort to curtail such conduct—but also a tacit
admission that it is widespread—ICE agreed to instruct its agents
about Fourth Amendment limitations on their activities. 109
Likewise, the Supreme Court’s relaxed interpretation of the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause in immigration proceedings
appears to have spilled into criminal prosecutions. Perhaps the most
significant example of federal prosecutions adopting less rigid
protections emblematic of civil immigration proceedings is
Operation Streamline, a federal response to the enormous number of
immigration prosecutions filed every year. 110 The federal criminal
system was simply not equipped with the resources necessary to
manage this unprecedented workload. According to the Judicial
Council of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, these
cases were “crushing” district courts within its jurisdiction. 111 Started
in 2005, this initiative allows courts to adjudicate criminal
immigration cases en masse—as many as 100 defendants appear at
the same time before a judge. 112 Some attorneys involved in
Operation Streamline proceedings refer to this as “assembly-line
justice.” 113 After witnessing these proceedings in Tucson, one
commentator, clearly appalled, described a scene where

108. Nina Bernstein, Raids Were a Shambles, Nassau Complains to U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
3, 2007, at C12.
109. See Aguilar v. ICE, No. 1:07-cv-08224-KBF, slip op. at 5–6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4,
2013).
110. See Donald Kerwin & Kristen McCabe, Arrested on Entry: Operation Streamline and
the Prosecution of Immigration Crimes, MIGRATION POLICY INST. (Apr. 29, 2010),
http://www.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/print.cfm?ID=780.
111. In re Approval of Jud. Emer. Decl. in Dist. of Ariz., 639 F.3d 970, 979 (9th Cir.
2011).
112. See Kerwin & McCabe, supra note 110.
113. See Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281, 1351
n.405 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) [hereinafter Eagly, Prosecuting
Immigration]. For a compelling discussion of the procedural shortcomings Operation
Streamline creates, see Chacón, supra note 16, at 145–47.
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approximately seventy defendants were processed: “It is doubtful
that most truly understand what they are agreeing to, often
encountering the US court system for their first time, dealing with
an interpreter, and being rushed through the system (each defendant
is given one hour at most with a lawyer, shared with several other
defendants, and the hearings typically last less than two hours for the
entire seventy defendants).” 114 The Chief Judge of the U.S. District
Court for the District of New Mexico expressed similar concerns
when he explained that judges “try very hard to conduct their
hearings in a way that is understandable to the defendants,” but then
noted that most defendants in these proceedings have little formal
education and minimal knowledge of the U.S. legal system. 115 Such
proceedings clash with the requirement of Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11(b) that, prior to accepting a plea, the court address
each defendant “personally” and ensure that each plea is entered
voluntarily. 116 Conversely, these en masse hearings actually resemble
civil immigration proceedings where immigration judges preside over
multiple cases per day with some studies indicating that they have as
few as seventy-three minutes per matter. 117 In addition, the en masse
style of these proceedings treads on the attorney-client privilege by
making it difficult for attorneys to consult with defendants in
private. 118 This too resembles immigration proceedings insofar as
attorneys frequently lack private spaces in which to meet with clients,
especially when proceedings are conducted by televideo equipment
and the attorney is not in the same location as the client. 119
114. Andrew Burridge, Differential Criminalization Under Operation Streamline:
Challenges to Freedom of Movement and Humanitarian Aid Provision in the Mexico-US
Borderlands, 26 REFUGE 78, 81 (2009).
115. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT ON THE IMPACT ON THE JUDICIARY
OF LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES ALONG THE SOUTHWEST BORDER 16 (2008).
116. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2); see United States v. Roblero-Solis, 588 F.3d 692, 699–
701 (9th Cir. 2009) (concluding that an Operation Streamline proceeding prevented the court
from meeting its obligation under Rule 11, but going on to uphold the conviction because the
defendant failed to satisfy the applicable standard of review). But see United States v. ArquetaRamos, 730 F.3d 1133, 1139, 1142 (9th Cir. 2013) (concluding that a conviction obtained
through an Operation Streamline proceeding violated Rule 11 and vacating the conviction).
117. Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J.
1635, 1651–52 (2010).
118. Juan Rocha, Operation Streamline and the Criminal Justice System, THE
CHAMPION, Nov. 2011, at 30.
119. See
DORA
SCHRIRO,
IMMIGRATION
DETENTION
OVERVIEW
AND
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Besides incorporating civil immigration law’s relaxed approach to
Fourth and Fifth Amendment doctrines, criminal prosecutions of
immigration-related activity now exhibit immigration law’s looser
approach to assistance of counsel. In the 1990s, federal prosecutors
began a practice of “fast-track” plea agreements. 120 These “plea
agreements offer noncitizen defendants charged with an immigration
crime a reduced sentence in exchange for quickly waiving a host of
rights and consenting to immediate sentencing and removal.” 121
Today, fast-track pleas require that defendants waive the right to
suppress evidence, challenge the sufficiency of the charging
document, appeal, and seek a sentencing variance. 122 Because fasttrack plea offers typically require defendants to decide whether to
accept or reject a plea offer within two weeks, some criminal defense
attorneys have complained that they do not have enough time to
adequately investigate the law and facts pertinent to the client’s
predicament. 123 Although no court has held as much regarding fasttrack pleas, criminal defense attorneys who advise their clients about
the best course of action without engaging in thorough investigation
of the relevant law and facts would seem to deny these defendants
the right to effective assistance of counsel provided by the Sixth
Amendment. 124

RECOMMENDATIONS 23 (2009); Letter from Robert D. Evans, Dir., Am. Bar Ass’n Gov’t
Affairs Office, to Michael J. Creppy, Chief Immigration Judge 2 (Dec. 19, 2003), available at
http://apps.americanbar.org/poladv/letters/108th/immig121903.pdf; see also SEATTLE
UNIV. SCH. OF LAW INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, VOICES FROM DETENTION: A REPORT
ON HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AT THE NORTHWEST DETENTION CENTER 37–39 (2008)
(noting that immigration detention staff can overhear conversations between attorneys and
detained clients).
120. See Alan D. Bersin & Judith S. Feigin, The Rule of Law at the Border: Reinventing
Prosecution Policy in the Southern District of California, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 285, 301
(1998).
121. César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Strickland-Lite: Padilla’s Two-Tiered Duty for
Noncitizens, 72 MD. L. REV. 844, 918 (2013).
122. See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice to
All U.S. Attorneys 3–4 (Jan. 31, 2012), available at www.justice.gov/dag/fast-trackprogram.pdf.
123. See Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, supra note 113, at 1322; Joint Statement of
Thomas W. Hillier II, Fed. Pub. Defender, W. Dist. of Wash., & Davina Chen, Assistant Fed.
Pub. Defender, Cent. Dist. of Cal., The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: 25 Years Later: Public
Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm. 28 (May 27, 2009).
124. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690–91 (1984); García Hernández,
supra note 121, at 921–22.
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A relaxed interpretation of the right to assistance of counsel fits
neatly into immigration law, but less so within the law of criminal
procedure. Individuals in immigration proceedings are granted a
statutory right to counsel and some federal courts even recognize a
constitutional right to counsel that arises from the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 125 One circuit hinted at the
possibility of a constitutional right to appointed counsel in some
circumstances, but no court has ever actually appointed counsel in an
immigration proceeding under this reasoning. 126 Moreover, the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel does not apply to immigration
proceedings. 127 In contrast, criminal proceedings are subject to the
extensive body of law interpreting the Sixth Amendment’s counsel
guarantee, including its requirement that counsel provide effective
assistance. 128
The Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky 129 arguably
follows this trend. Though recognizing for the first time that the
Sixth Amendment’s right to effective assistance of counsel requires
defense attorneys to provide noncitizen clients with advice about the
immigration consequences of conviction, Padilla adopts an approach
that I have elsewhere dubbed “Strickland-lite” to signify its
weakening of the standard for effective assistance of counsel that
usually applies in criminal proceedings. 130 Rather than ensuring that
criminal defendants are fully informed about the immigration risk
associated with pleading guilty or nolo contendere to a criminal
charge, Padilla requires less of criminal defense attorneys by way of

125. INA § 292, 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2012); see Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 369,
374 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Uspango v. Ashcroft, 289 F.3d 226, 231 (3d Cir. 2002)); United
States v. Torres-Sanchez, 68 F.3d 227, 230 (8th Cir. 1995); Jiang v. Houseman, 904 F. Supp.
971, 978 (D. Minn. 1995); Nunez v. Boldin, 537 F. Supp. 578, 582 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
126. Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565, 568 (6th Cir. 1975); see Geoffrey Heeren,
Illegal Aid: Legal Assistance to Immigrants in the United States, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 619,
668 (2011).
127. See Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 237 (1960) (holding that “deportation
proceedings are not subject to the constitutional safeguards for criminal prosecutions”); Matter
of Compean, 24 I. & N. Dec. 710, 716–17 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2009), vacated on other grounds,
25 I. & N. Dec. 1 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2009) (collecting cases from the federal circuits).
128. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685.
129. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
130. See generally García Hernández, supra note 121.
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investigating the client’s circumstance, an approach which privileges
efficiency over illumination. 131
Combined, these developments alter the very nature of criminal
proceedings. Rather than the robust—though susceptible to all
manner of criticism—norms that have traditionally protected
criminal defendants from the state’s prosecutorial power, “we are . . .
witnessing the importation of the relaxed procedural norms of civil
immigration proceedings into the criminal realm.” 132 Operation
Streamline, fast-track plea agreements, and Padilla’s relaxed effective
assistance of counsel requirement are evocative not of traditional
criminal proceedings, but rather of immigration proceedings where
noncitizens are processed en masse, rights are limited, and legal
counsel is viewed as a luxury rather than a necessity.
D. Policing Crimmigration Law
As substantive and procedural criminal law has become
increasingly intertwined with substantive and procedural
immigration law, the methods of policing the two bodies of law have
transcended the historic boundary between the two. 133 Today, it is
appropriate to talk of “policing immigration” 134 and immigrationizing traditional criminal policing. 135 No better lens through which
to study this convergence exists than detention. The number of
noncitizens confined to a secured facility—whether a county jail or a
specialized immigration detention center—is at unprecedented
levels. 136 Meanwhile, the explosive growth of federal criminal

131. See id. at 921–22.
132. Chacón, supra note 16, at 137.
133. See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Policing Immigration, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 87,
87 (2013) (claiming that the Secure Communities program “accelerates the ongoing
convergence of the immigration and criminal bureaucracies in the United States”).
134. See generally id.
135. See Chacón, supra note 16, at 137 (explaining “that the protective features of
criminal investigation and adjudication are melting away at the edges in certain criminal cases
involving migration-related offenses”).
136. WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 46–47
(2011); see Heather Ann Thompson, Why Mass Incarceration Matters: Rethinking Crisis,
Decline, and Transformation in Postwar American History, 97 J. AM. HIST. 703, 703–04
(2010).
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prosecutions for immigration-related activity means “[n]oncitizens
have become the face of federal prisons.” 137
Immigration detention, historically little used, has become the
most salient feature of immigration law enforcement. In fiscal year
2011, DHS maintained custody of 429,247 people. 138 This figure
represented its largest number of detained individuals to date and the
first time the immigration detainee population topped 400,000. 139 It
was, however, a continuation of a recent trend of a growing
detention population. 140 Importantly, these detained individuals are
not awaiting criminal prosecution or serving a penalty for having
been convicted of a crime. DHS has no authority to impose
detention for such reasons. 141 Instead, they are detained while
waiting to learn whether they will be allowed to remain in the
United States. 142 This is an administrative determination adjudicated
through the federal government’s immigration bureaucracy—ICE,
the immigration courts, the Board of Immigration Appeals, and, in
some instances, reviewed by the federal courts. 143 On average,
individuals spend between one and three months in immigration
confinement. 144 Based on 2009 data, between one and three percent
of individuals remained in detention longer than one year. 145 Applied

137. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, supra note 113, at 1282.
138. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2011
ANNUAL REPORT 5 tbl.4 (2012).
139. See DORIS MEISSNER ET AL., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES: THE RISE OF A FORMIDABLE MACHINERY 126 fig.30 (2013) (graphically charting the
immigration detention population since 2001).
140. See id.
141. Id. at 125.
142. See INA § 236(a), (c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), (c) (2012); INA § 241(a)(1)–(2), 8
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)–(2) (2012).
143. See DAN KESSELBRENNER & LORY D. ROSENBERG, IMMIGRATION LAW & CRIMES
§ 8:20; Alina Das, The Immigration Penalties of Criminal Convictions: Resurrecting
Categorical Analysis in Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1684 (2011); see also Mark
Noferi, Cascading Constitutional Deprivation: The Right to Appointed Counsel for Mandatorily
Detained Immigrants Pending Removal Proceedings, 64 MICH. J. RACE & L. 63, 75 (2012)
(graphically displaying the administrative process for detaining an individual in removal
proceedings).
144. See Geoffrey Heeren, Pulling Teeth: The State of Mandatory Immigration Detention,
45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 601, 602 n.6 (2010) (citing competing estimates, one by ICE
and another by the Migration Policy Institute, reporting that, on average, people remained in
immigration detention thirty days or eighty-one days, respectively).
145. See id.
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to DHS’s 2011 population, this would mean that between 4292 and
12,877 individuals had spent more than a year waiting to learn their
fate while sitting in a detention facility.
The facilities in which noncitizens are held pending
immigration adjudications frequently carry all the hallmarks of
penal confinement. 146 They are operated based on standards
developed for penal incarceration. 147 Like prisons and jails used
to detain criminal inmates, detention centers are secure
environments where inmates’ movements are strictly dictated
and closely observed. 148 Segregated housing is not uncommon. 149
The largest facilities tend to be located in remote areas far
removed from legal communities of any significant size and
social support networks. 150 And most attesting to their penal
character, many facilities—though each holds few detainees—are
in fact jails from which ICE has simply rented space. 151
Meanwhile, several policing trends that originated in
immigration law enforcement have expanded into criminal law
enforcement. Like many people serving sentences as a result of a
criminal conviction, 152 a growing number of immigration detainees
are confined in privately owned or operated prisons. 153 Neither ICE

146. See SCHRIRO, supra note 119, at 4.
147. See MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 139, at 128.
148. See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, JAILS AND JUMPSUITS: TRANSFORMING THE U.S.
IMMIGRATION DETENTION SYSTEM—A TWO-YEAR REVIEW 8, 35 (2011). Human Rights
First contends that immigration detainees are permitted less freedom of movement within the
facility than inmates at thirty-five Bureau of Prison facilities. Id. at 36.
149. See NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR., INVISIBLE IN ISOLATION: THE USE OF
SEGREGATION AND SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION 3 (2012); see also
Ian Urbina & Catherine Rentz, Immigrants Held in Solitary Cells, Often for Weeks, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 23, 2013, at A1.
150. See César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Due Process and Immigrant Detainee
Prison Transfers: Moving LPRs to Isolated Prisons Violates Their Right to Counsel, 21 BERKELEY
LA RAZA L.J. 17, 17–21 (2011).
151. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 148, at iii.
152. See E. ANN CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2011, 32 appx. tbl.15 (2012) (indicating that 130,941
state or federal prisoners were held in private prisons). According to The Sentencing Project,
over 130,000 people were incarcerated in private jails or prisons associated with a criminal
prosecution or conviction in 2011, representing approximately 8% of the total criminal jail and
prison population that year. See CODY MASON, INTERNATIONAL GROWTH TRENDS IN PRISON
PRIVATIZATION 9 (2013).
153. See The Influence of the Private Prison Industry in Immigration Detention, DET.
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nor its predecessor, INS, has built its own facility since the late
1990s. 154 Yet, its capacity has grown exponentially since then. This
growth has come in part through contracts with private prison
corporations, especially the Corrections Corporation of America
(“CCA”) and the GEO Group, the country’s two largest such
companies. 155 Indeed, an INS contract with CCA in 1983 launched
the modern era of private imprisonment. 156 Since then, private
prisons have come to fill approximately half of the nation’s
immigration detention demand. 157
Other tactics associated with immigration law policing have also
gained traction in the criminal realm and expanded detention. The
suspicionless searches that have long characterized immigration law
enforcement along the southwest border 158 have become a feature of
policing in nearly every jurisdiction in the United States through the
Obama Administration’s enthusiastic support of the Secure
Communities program. 159 Through Secure Communities, law
enforcement agencies effectively partner with ICE to identify
potentially removable individuals by sharing with the federal agency
identification information about every person taken into police
custody. 160 In this way, the federal government augments its
immigration law enforcement capacity by tapping the workforce of
police agencies throughout the country. This expanded reach
increases the detained population in two ways. First, it increases the
length of time individuals are held by criminal police authorities
WATCH NETWORK, http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/privateprisons (last visited July
25, 2013); see also TOM BARRY, BORDER WARS 4 (2011) (describing private immigration
prisons as “the new face of imprisonment in America”).
154. See Corrections Corp. of America, Investor Presentation 20 (Mar. 2012), available at
http://crimmigration.com/files/0/6/4/7/5/167292-157460/Q4_2011_Investor_Presentation.pdf.
155. See id. at 7.
156. BARRY, supra note 153, at 10.
157. See The Influence of the Private Prison Industry in Immigration Detention, supra note 153.
158. See, e.g., United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155 (2004) (explaining
that the federal government is authorized to conduct suspicionless searches at the border).
159. As of August 22, 2012, Secure Communities was active in 97% of jurisdictions in
the United States. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Activated Jurisdictions,
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/sc-activated2.pdf
(last
ICE.GOV,
visited Sept. 15, 2013).
160. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Secure Communities: The Secure
Communities Process, ICE.GOV, http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/ (last visited Sept.
15, 2013).
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because ICE issues a “detainer” on people who are identified as
potentially removable. 161 In the agency’s view, detainers allow it to
request that the law enforcement agency maintain custody for up to
forty-eight hours after the basis for criminally detaining the
individual ends. 162 Second, because the individuals identified
through Secure Communities have already interacted with the
criminal justice system (through the form of police officers, at a
minimum), many have been convicted of a crime. According to ICE,
approximately 1.1 million people convicted of any crime were
identified through Secure Communities between fiscal year 2009
and fiscal year 2012. 163 Since ICE does not report the types of
offenses that these people were convicted of committing, it is not
possible to know what percentage was subject to immigration
detention. Nonetheless, the INA’s mandatory detention provisions
are quite broad and cover offenses as serious as rape and as minor as
simple marijuana possession. 164 The statute’s discretionary detention
provision, of course, allows an immigration judge to deny bond to
any person who does not fall into a mandatory detention basis but is
deemed dangerous or at risk of absconding. 165 As such, it is
reasonable to assume that many of these 1.1 million were detained
pending removal proceedings.
The end result of the expanded list of crimes that may result in
removal, the growing willingness to regulate immigration through
federal and subfederal penal codes, the adoption of relaxed
procedural norms to prosecute immigration crimes, and the
conflation of immigration and criminal policing norms has melted
away a stark boundary that once existed between criminal law and
immigration law. Instead, “the civil immigration system and the

161. Id.
162. Id.
163. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Secure Communities: Monthly Statistics
Through
September
30,
2012,
ICE.GOV,
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/scstats/nationwide_interop_ stats-fy2012.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2013).
164. See INA § 236(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012). Section 236(c) references INA
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) which in turn references the “aggravated felony” term that is defined at
INA § 101(a)(43)(A) to include rape. Section 236(c) also references INA § 237(a)(2)(B),
which includes any controlled substance offense including simple possession of marijuana
“other than a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less.” INA
§ 237(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B).
165. See INA § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

1484

DO NOT DELETE

1457

1/27/2014 11:03 AM

Creating Crimmigration

criminal justice system are a single, intertwined regulatory
bureaucracy that moves between criminal and civil enforcement
mechanisms.” 166 Remaining to be discussed, though, is why this
conflation occurred when it did during the closing decades of the
twentieth century. To understand that, it is important to place
crimmigration law within the social and legal context in which it
initially developed.
III. CONTEXTUALIZING CRIMMIGRATION
As detailed above, criminal law and immigration law have
intersected to some degree since the earliest days of the nation’s
history. Throughout those centuries, antagonism toward noncitizens
has appeared regularly, and special vile has been heaped onto
individuals with criminal records. Yet, the deep intertwinement of
criminal law and immigration law that has come to be known as
crimmigration law did not develop until the 1980s and 1990s. What
was different about the closing decades of the twentieth century that
produced the development of crimmigration law? The answer lies in
the evolving role that race occupies in law. Cultural and legal shifts
in race relations spurred by the civil rights movements of the midtwentieth century constrained reliance on overt racism. In place of
openly racist rhetoric and de jure racism, policymakers adopted
facially neutral legal regimes in criminal law and procedure and
immigration law and procedure that proved anything but racially
neutral in practice. Crucially, lawmakers concerned about the civil
rights era’s elimination of cultural and legal mechanisms used to
subordinate entire racial groups turned to the government’s criminal
law power to stigmatize and punish. With the legitimacy of
ostensibly race-neutral criminal law and procedure, lawmakers
reproduced the racial hierarchies of decades past.
A. Post-Civil Rights Constraints on Overt Racism
A final verdict on the success of the civil rights struggles of the
1940s-1970s remains unwritten, if such an assessment is even
possible. 167 What is clear, however, is that the broad-based efforts

166. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, supra note 113, at 1359.
167. See HARVARD SITKOFF, THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK EQUALITY, 1954–1992, vii–viii
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organized in those decades radically changed the way that the
United States discusses race. On the whole, it is no longer culturally
acceptable to speak of communities or individuals of color in
blatantly derogatory language. 168 In large part, it is also not
permissible to legally marginalize or discriminate against groups of
people of color based on race alone. These mid-century
accomplishments literally altered the face of immigration law.
Prior to the civil rights era, immigration discourse was explicitly
focused on pejorative racialized depictions of prospective
immigrants. As Frank P. Sargent, who from 1902 to 1908 served as
the nation’s first Commissioner of Immigration, explained while
speaking about the Chinese, there were “difficulties inherent in the
character of the Mongolian race to be met and surmounted,” and he
would do all he could to ensure that immigration law enforcement
under his watch met this challenge. 169 Albert Johnson, a United
States Senator who spearheaded passage of the National Origins Act
of 1924, wrote of the perils of “Russian Poles or Polish Jews of the
usual ghetto type . . . . They are filthy un-American and often
dangerous in their habits.” 170 No more influential example of this
prevailing wisdom exists than the Senate commission led by Senator
William Dillingham, which, relying on the theory of scientific racism
that claimed that blacks, Asians, and southern and eastern Europeans
were inferior to northern and western Europeans, concluded that the
United States needed to slow immigration from southern and
eastern Europe—the principal sources of that period’s immigrants. 171
This and similar rhetoric led to a host of restrictionist
immigration laws premised on race-based exclusions. The Chinese

(1993) (describing writing a history of the civil rights era as a “hazardous task”).
168. The reaction to revelations that celebrity chef Paula Deen made racist comments
exemplifies the cultural disapproval of explicitly expressing such attitudes. See Tom Dart, Paula
Deen Let Go by Food Network Over Use of Racially-Charged Language, THE GUARDIAN (U.K)
(June 22, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/22/paula-deen-foodnetwork-racial-language.
169. ERIKA LEE, AT AMERICA’S GATES: CHINESE IMMIGRATION DURING THE
EXCLUSION ERA, 1882–1943, at 67 (2003).
170. PETER SCHRAG, NOT FIT FOR OUR SOCIETY: IMMIGRATION AND NATIVISM IN
AMERICA 115 (2010).
171. See HULL, supra note 19, at 14; see also DANIEL J. TICHENOR, DIVIDING LINES:
THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION CONTROL IN AMERICA 250, 250 (2002) (describing the
Dillingham Commission’s findings as “pseudoscientific” and nativist).
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Exclusion Act famously identified its target group in the law’s name.
In 1917, Congress barred entry of anyone whose ancestry was traced
to the “so-called Asiatic Barred Zone.” 172 These exclusionary laws
meant that Asian populations would remain low for decades to
come. 173 Later enactments were barely less overt in their
discriminatory intent, though they branched beyond Asians. The
National Origins Act, enacted in 1921 and part of immigration law
for the next four decades, allotted visas for new immigrants not by
family ties or employment, as immigration law presently does, but
rather by country of origin, thereby allotting numerical quotas for
ethnic backgrounds. 174 Worse, it expressly favored immigration by
racial groups already dominant in the United States by tying future
immigration to the number of citizens of particular countries that
were in the United States in 1910. 175 Three years later, Congress
pegged the new immigrant quota to the 1890 Census and capped
total European immigration at 150,000 per year. 176 Western
Hemisphere countries were not subject to the quota. 177 Given the
origins of the population at that time, the end result of the two
quota acts indisputably favored prospective immigrants from
northern and western Europe: Great Britain, for example, which at
the time had approximately two percent of the world’s population,
received forty-three percent of the allotment. 178 Asians, in contrast,
were almost entirely excluded. 179
Mexicans too would suffer no shortage of overtly discriminatory
measures. In 1951, President Harry Truman’s Commission on
Migratory Labor cautioned that “wetback traffic . . . is virtually an

172. See Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the
Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 14 (1998).
173. See MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF
MODERN AMERICA 18 (2004).
174. See James F. Smith, A Nation That Welcomes Immigrants? An Historical
Examination of United States Immigration Policy, 1 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 227, 232
(1995); see also INA § 203(a)-(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)-(b) (2012) (providing the current
family-based and employment-based immigration options).
175. See Immigration Act of 1921, ch. 8, §§ 2(a)-(c), 42 Stat. 5, 5-6.
176. Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, ch. 190, § 11(a), (b), 43 Stat. 153,
159; see HULL, supra note 19, at 18.
177. Smith, supra note 174, at 232.
178. See HULL, supra note 19, at 18.
179. See id.
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invasion,” using what Kanstroom describes as “a racial epithet with
stereotypical images of law-breaking Mexican border crossers, the
archetypal ‘illegal alien.’” 180 Meanwhile, the United States and
Mexican governments implemented multiple strategies targeting
unauthorized emigration from México into the United States. 181
These initiatives famously climaxed in the summer of 1954 when the
Border Patrol, acting at Attorney General Herbert Brownell’s
instruction, launched Operation Wetback. 182 According to Kelly
Lytle Hernández, “eight hundred Border Patrol officers swept
through the southwestern United States performing a series of raids,
road blocks, and mass deportations. By the end of the year, Brownell
was able to announce that the summer campaign had been a success
by contributing to the apprehension and deportation of over one
million persons, mostly Mexican nationals, during 1954.” 183
A decade later, the world, and the United States within it, was a
different place. Through sustained organizing and, not
uncommonly, physical injury and loss of life, civil rights activists had
caught the public’s attention and propelled key legislation through
Congress, including the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
Voting Rights Act of 1965. In different ways, each piece of
legislation sought to stem the decades of overt racial discrimination
that had been heaped onto communities of color. Simultaneously,
the Cold War, then at its peak, injected a dose of foreign policy
realism into domestic affairs. When the INS Commissioner in the
early 1950s proposed building a fence and watch towers along
portions of the Arizona and California border, the State Department
“envisioned photographs in the Moscow newspapers” and
objected. 184 Likewise, President Truman, in vetoing the Immigration
Act of 1952 (which was subsequently enacted after Congress
overrode his veto), described the national origins quotas that the bill
maintained as “a slur on the patriotism . . . of our citizenry” and

180. KANSTROOM, supra note 6, at 221, 223. A year after Operation Wetback, the INS
proclaimed that it sought to curtail the “wetback invasion.” HULL, supra note 19, at 84.
181. See Kelly Lytle Hernández, The Crimes and Consequences of Illegal Immigration: A
Cross-Border Examination of Operation Wetback, 1943 to 1954, 37 W. HIST. Q. 421, 422
(2006).
182. See id.
183. Id. at 421.
184. NGAI, supra note 173, at 156.
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argued that, instead, the United States needed “a fitting instrument
for our foreign policy and a true reflection of the ideals we stand for,
at home and abroad.” 185 That instrument, according to liberals of
the era, was an immigration policy that subjected everyone to a
regime of formal equality—where prospective immigrants from every
country were treated identically and qualifying criteria for new
immigrant visas were not tied to markers of race. 186
Buoyed by the civil rights movement’s successes, Congress
followed that liberal vision of formal equality the next time it enacted
immigration legislation. 187 Over four decades after they were initially
adopted, the Immigration Act of 1965 (commonly referred to as the
Hart-Celler Act) finally repealed the national origins quotas, ending
an overtly racist form of restrictionist immigration policies. 188 The
1965 Act’s most striking alteration of immigration law was to impose
uniform immigration rules on large sets of countries. 189 Among
other changes, the Act allotted each country of the Eastern
Hemisphere 20,000 visas per year with a maximum of 170,000. 190
Unlike previous enactments, however, the Act imposed a cap of
120,000 to be divided according to demand by Western Hemisphere
countries. 191 Eleven years later, in 1976, Congress extended the percountry limit to the Western Hemisphere. 192 With the exception of
parents, spouses, and unmarried minor children of United States
citizens, only 20,000 people from any given country could receive
permission to enter the United States each year. 193

185. Id. at 239.
186. See id. at 245.
187. See KEVIN R. JOHNSON, OPENING THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO
RETHINK ITS BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION LAWS 51, 103 (2007) (linking the civil rights
movement to enactment of the 1965 act); MOTOMURA, supra note 12, at 132 (“[T]he [1965]
amendments were part of a basic movement toward civil rights in American public law that
included the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.”); NGAI, supra note
173, at 13 (explaining that the “conventional view” was that the 1965 act was a “liberal
reform”).
188. See NGAI, supra note 173, at 227.
189. See MOTOMURA, supra note 12, at 131.
190. See NGAI, supra note 173, at 258.
191. See id.; see also id. at 254 (“The Immigration Acts of 1924 and 1952 did not impose
numerical restrictions on immigration from countries of the Western Hemisphere.”).
192. See id. at 261.
193. See id. at 258.
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Citizens of countries that had long been under tight immigration
controls made quick use of the Hart-Celler Act’s liberalization.
Asians, in particular, experienced newfound immigration
opportunities in light of the 1965 Act. 194 Most immigration by
Asians was prohibited from the closing decades of the nineteenth
century through the bulk of the twentieth century’s first half. 195 The
1952 Act eliminated the last of the Asian exclusion laws—applied
until then against Japanese and Koreans—but imposed restrictive
quotas on all immigration from the “Asia Pacific Triangle.” 196 The
Hart-Celler Act’s equal allotment of visas to each country suddenly
opened new paths to the United States. 197 By 1971, four of the top
six countries outside the Western Hemisphere from which new
immigrants arrived were in Asia. 198
At the same time, the Hart-Cellar Act propagated a more subtle
set of policies that converted immigration from particular countries
with significant and long-standing ties to the United States,
especially México, into the picture of illegality 199 by inaugurating an
era of immigration controls from Latin America unlike anything
previously imposed. The hemisphere-wide cap and the countryspecific limit as applied to Mexican immigration proved woefully
lower than demand. 200 Indeed, a commission created by the HartCeller Act to study its implementation urged a repeal of the
hemispheric maximum and, if per-country ceilings were to exist,

194. LEE, supra note 169, at 246.
195. See id. As an illustration of this regional exclusion, the Immigration Act of 1917
referenced the “Asiatic Barred Zone” that “effectively excluded all immigrants from India,
Burma, Siam, the Malay States, Arabia, Afghanistan, part of Russia, and most of the Polynesian
Islands.” Id. at 39. With the exception of Filipinos, Asian exclusion was “perfected,” Lee
writes, by immigration statutes enacted in 1921 and 1924; Filipinos were excluded in 1934.
Id.
196. See NGAI, supra note 173, at 238.
197. See MOTOMURA, supra note 12, at 133.
198. See NGAI, supra note 173, at 262 & n.120 (noting that the top sending countries to
the USA in 1971 were, in order, the Philippines, Italy, Greece, China, India, and Korea).
199. See NGAI, supra note 173, at 227 (positing that the 1965 Act “reproduce[d] the
problem of illegal immigration, especially from Mexico, to the present day”); see also
DOROTHEE SCHNEIDER, CROSSING BORDERS: MIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE
TWENTIETH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 238–39 (2011) (noting the 1965 Act’s adverse impact
on Mexican immigration).
200. See KELLY LYTLE HERNÁNDEZ, MIGRA!: A HISTORY OF THE U.S. BORDER PATROL
214 (2010) [hereinafter HERNÁNDEZ, MIGRA!].
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proposed that each Western Hemisphere country be allotted 40,000
slots. 201 Even 40,000 would have been substantially lower than the
number of Mexicans entering the United States with some form of
authorization to work in the early 1960s, which was upwards of
200,000 per year. 202
When Hart-Celler’s limitations went into effect, the result was as
immediate as it was long lasting. Mexicans kept coming to the
United States—indeed, Mexican migration appears to have increased
after 1965 because an established Mexican community existed in the
United States by then and the Mexican economy soured—only now
they lacked permission to do so. 203 Net unauthorized migration—
that is, the difference between the number of unauthorized
individuals who entered the country and those who left—jumped
from zero before the 1965 Act was enacted to approximately
300,000 per year by the close of the 1980s. 204 The Border Patrol
responded by “return[ing] to aggressive migration control tactics”
targeting unauthorized Mexicans. 205 Not surprisingly, deportations
skyrocketed. 206 In 1976, for example, the INS deported 781,000
Mexicans. 207 That same year it deported fewer than 100,000 people
from the rest of the world combined. 208 The imposition of quotas on
Western Hemisphere immigration and per-country ceilings fanned
unauthorized Mexican immigration like nothing else in the history of
the two nations and “recast Mexican migration as ‘illegal.’” 209
Without question, the Hart-Celler Act had the effect of
diversifying the racial composition of new immigration as the last
quarter of the twentieth century began. 210 But that diversity was not
without significant complication. 211 The Act ignored social and
201.
202.
203.
204.

See NGAI, supra note 173, at 261.
See id.
See MOTOMURA, supra note 12, at 135; SCHNEIDER, supra note 199, at 239.
Douglas S. Massey, Epilogue to The Past and Future of Mexico-U.S. Migration, in
BEYOND LA FRONTERA: THE HISTORY OF MEXICO-U.S. MIGRATION 251, 254 (Mark
Overmyer-Velázquez ed., 2011).
205. HERNÁNDEZ, MIGRA!, supra note 200, at 215.
206. See id. at 216.
207. NGAI, supra note 173, at 261.
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 199, at 243.
211. See KEVIN R. JOHNSON & BERNARD TRUJILLO, IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE US-
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economic realities that drive immigration. It made no allowance for
the unique relationship between the United States and México—the
historical reliance on low-skill Mexican labor by numerous industries
in the United States, a pattern of formal governmental and
nongovernmental recruitment of Mexican workers, geographic
proximity, personal relationships that spread across borders, and the
ease with which generations of Mexicans had moved from one
country to the other. Yet none of these factors changed when the
lawful means of migration was suddenly capped by the 1965 Act and
its 1976 amendments. 212
By framing its formal equality regarding the number of people
from a given country who could lawfully immigrate each year as a
gesture of fairness, immigration law pinned the onus of unauthorized
immigration on the migrants themselves. 213 Rather than query the
underlying motivation for Mexican immigration or the willingness to
do so in contravention of United States immigration law, Mexican
migrants could be blamed for causing unauthorized immigration. 214
In this way, unauthorized immigration became framed as a moral
issue and unauthorized immigrants as moral scofflaws. 215 When
policymakers became willing to turn to the criminal justice system to
deal with all manner of perceived moral failings, as the next section
explains, immigrants were caught up in this frenzy.

MEXICO BORDER: ¿SÍ SE PUEDE? 125 (2011) (explaining that the 1965 Act “coupled more
generous treatment of those outside the Western Hemisphere with less generous treatment of
Latin Americans”).
212. NGAI, supra note 173, at 257 (noting that the 1965 Act curtailed legal avenues for
Mexican immigration without addressing factors motivating Mexicans to come to the United
States to work).
213. See id. at 246–48.
214. See David Fitzgerald, Mexican Migration and the Law, in BEYOND LA FRONTERA:
THE HISTORY OF MEXICO-U.S. MIGRATION, supra note 204, at 179, 192 (“Building on the
legal fact that Mexicans are disproportionately represented among the unauthorized
population, restrictionist politicians have been effective in discursively presenting illegal
immigration as a ‘Mexican’ problem.”).
215. See Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship & Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the
New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 615 (2003) [hereinafter Miller, Citizenship] (“The
American Public now represents the primary victim of flawed immigration practices; a victim in
need of protection from immigrants draining welfare coffers and failing to culturally assimilate
into the white middle-class.”).
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B. Crime as a Marker of Undesirability

Civil rights era legislative successes did not assure the end of
deeply ingrained racial biases that dominated the United States’
history. Instead, individuals who in the past had openly championed
explicitly racialized methods of subjugating people of color set their
sights on discrimination packaged in a race-neutral veneer. 216 They
found their answer in crime. 217 A “law and order” discourse that had
existed in limited fashion prior to the demise of Jim Crow quickly
gained ground as the new paradigm of choice for governing social
relations. 218
Understanding the cultural salience of crime that developed after
the civil rights era 219 requires grappling with its political utility. To
be sure, reported crime rates did increase in the years following the
1960s. 220 This upswing can partly be explained by the fact that the
baby boom generation reached the prime crime-committing years at
this time. 221 Millions of young men suddenly had the physical
maturity and mental wherewithal to engage in antisocial behavior,
including criminal activity. 222 Crime rates did not, however, drive the
newfound fear of crime. Rather, crime became more salient because
it was more frequently pegged as the cause of social disarray. In her
study of the war on drugs, Katherine Beckett concludes that “the
extent to which political elites highlight the crime and drug
problems is closely linked to subsequent levels of public concern
about them and thus suggest that political initiative played a crucial

216. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 40, 42 (2010).
217. See Ian Haney López, Post-Racial Racialism: Racial Stratification and Mass
Incarceration in the Age of Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1023, 1033–34 (2010) (noting that
“[t]he contest pitting law and order against civil rights” became increasingly tilted toward
anticrime legislation after 1965).
218. See ALEXANDER, supra note 216, at 40.
219. See DAVID J. GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER
IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 10 (2001) (“Since the 1970s fear of crime has come to have new
salience.”).
220. See id. at 153; JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR
ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 24
(2007) [hereinafter SIMON, GOVERNING].
221. STUNTZ, supra note 136, at 20.
222. See MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 50–51 (1999).
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role in generating public concern about crime and drugs.” 223 Indeed,
in public opinion polls, United States residents did not show any
growing concern for drug activity until politicians, led by President
Reagan’s decision to focus so much of his domestic policy on drugs,
began framing it as a public-safety threat. 224
Added to this heightened awareness of crime was a belief that the
new criminals were of a different variety than past lawbreakers.
Unlike before, the criminals driving this new appreciation of crime
were thought to be “incorrigible” repeat offenders, “young minority
males, caught up in the underclass world of crime, drugs, broken
families, and welfare dependency.” 225 These were not individuals
who could be rehabilitated. They were portrayed as lost souls—
“desperate, driven, and capable of mindless violence,” as David
Garland describes the rhetoric of the period 226—prowling for the
moment at which they could pounce on an unsuspecting, innocent
victim. And they would do so time and time again unless stopped. 227
In response, the “broken windows theory” of criminal policing
caught the attention of influential law enforcement officials and
policymakers. 228 Crystallized in a short 1982 magazine article by
James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, the theory posited that
criminality built upon itself one minor incident at a time. 229 As
Wilson and Kelling memorably explained using a visual that
encapsulates the theory’s name, “if a window in a building is broken
and is left unrepaired, all the rest of the windows will soon be

223. KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN POLITICS 23 (1997).
224. See id. at 55, 62.
225. See GARLAND, supra note 219, at 10, 136.
226. Id. at 154.
227. See id. at 180–81 (“The assumption today is that there is no such thing as an ‘exoffender’—only offenders who have been caught before and will strike again.”).
228. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence
Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New
York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 302 (1998) (noting that New York City Mayor Rudolph
Giuliani and Police Commissioner William Bratton credited the broken windows theory as the
basis for their crime-fighting tactics).
229. See generally George J. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and
Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29; see also Harcourt, supra note
228 (“The hypothesis of the broken windows theory is that minor disorder in a neighborhood,
if left unchecked, will result in increased serious crime, and, therefore, that eliminating minor
disorder will have a deterrent effect on major crime.”).
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broken.” 230 The best governmental strategy to prevent this chaotic
escalation, they proposed, was “order-maintenance” policing—that
is, police initiatives that identify and remove social deviants of all
types from the streets, including people engaged in the most trivial
of crime. 231 “Who in their right mind, after all, would side with
people who urinate in the street, break windows, aggressively accost
passers-by, or vandalize other people’s property?,” asked Bernard
Harcourt in his critical explanation of the intuitive rationale that
made order-maintenance policing so captivating. 232 By targeting lowlevel offenders, order-maintenance policing proponents suggested
that people who are inclined to commit crime are dissuaded by the
realization that other community members care and the government
is ready to punish them, while also making the law-abiding
community members feel safer. 233
This anticrime rhetoric was ostensibly apolitical. Its purveyors did
not repeat past claims that people of color were inferior because of
identity characteristics or conduct necessarily tied to their race. 234
Rather, the new law and order proponents “developed instead the
racially sanitized rhetoric of ‘cracking down on crime.’” 235
Importantly, like the formal equality that the Hart-Celler Act
introduced into immigration law in 1965, criminal laws seem equally
applicable to everyone. 236 The elements of an offense do not favor
one person over another. 237 To violate the law, therefore, becomes
framed as a decision; one that reveals a moral failing that ought to be
sanctioned. 238
230. Kelling & Wilson, supra note 229.
231. Harcourt, supra note 228, at 301.
232. Id. at 298.
233. Id. at 353.
234. See ALEXANDER, supra note 216, at 42.
235. See id.; Barry C. Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court and the
Conservative “Backlash”, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1447, 1555–56 (2003).
236. See MOTOMURA, supra note 12, at 132 (describing the 1965 immigration
amendments as “apparently race-neutral”); Paul Butler, One Hundred Years of Race and
Crime, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1043, 1055 (2010) (“[M]ost criminal statutes have
been facially race-neutral for generations.”).
237. See Butler, supra note 236.
238. See GARLAND, supra note 219, at 185 (explaining that the criminological trends that
gained hold in the 1980s “adopt[ed] an absolutist, moralizing approach to crime, and
insist[ed] that criminal actions are voluntary, the bad choices of wicked individuals”); López,
supra note 217, at 1034 (“[T]he language of lawbreaking relied on and promoted a social
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But nothing is so simple. The shift from race-based
marginalization to an emphasis on crime masked racialized values
that were closely related to those previously expressed openly. The
rhetoric concerned with criminality “allowed for the indirect
expression of racially charged fears and antagonisms” by pointing to
the same people as the explicitly racist language of decades past had
done, only now it described them as lawbreakers. 239 Indeed,
prominent conservative politicians and activists in the 1960s
famously wooed southern white voters by tapping their “racial fears
and antagonisms,” launching what would come to be known as the
“southern strategy.” 240 After bearing the brunt of centuries of
explicitly racist laws and practices, blacks in particular were again
viewed as social outcasts—only now because of their supposed
criminality. 241 At the same time, middle-class white suburbanites
became idealized as victims—or, at least, potential victims—of
crime. 242 Indeed, “[d]espite the fact that blacks are far more likely to
be victims of crime . . . the majority of Americans believe that most
criminals are black and most victims are white.” 243
Meanwhile, fear of crime took on its own political significance. 244
Apart from the desire to prevent or avoid crime itself, policymakers
and the public viewed the threat of crime as a legitimate target. 245
Law enforcement agencies fashioned strategies “that took the
reduction of fear as a distinct, self-standing policy goal.” 246 They
promoted neighborhood watch programs, for example, that were
known to make people feel safer more than they actually made
people safer by reducing crime. 247 But, in this new penology, mental

vision of individual failure rooted in moral depravity.”).
239. See BECKETT, supra note 223, at 42.
240. See id. at 41; López, supra note 217, at 1032.
241. See BECKETT, supra note 223, at 38 (explaining that after Richard Nixon and
George Wallace trumpeted a concern about crime during the 1968 presidential campaign,
public opinion polls indicated that a substantial majority of people polled “believed that law
and order had broken down, and the majority blamed ‘Negroes who start riots’ and
‘communists’ for this state of affairs”).
242. See SIMON, GOVERNING, supra note 220, at 76.
243. BECKETT, supra note 223, at 84.
244. López, supra note 217, at 1037.
245. See GARLAND, supra note 219, at 10.
246. Id. at 122.
247. See id.
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insecurity caused by the fear of crime was as much a threat as
physical insecurity caused by the actual perpetration of crime.
C. Policing Severity
Accordingly, policymakers quickly searched for strategies to
tackle crime and the possibility that it might occur. They found their
answer in a panoply of measures that funneled more people into the
criminal justice system and limited the off-ramps on the road to
imprisonment. The most palpable of these measures were the
practices that shifted the locus of discretion from judges to
prosecutors, the militaristic law enforcement methods that became
common among police departments, and the expanded use of
imprisonment.
The criminal justice system is filled with instances in which
individual actors meaningfully exercise discretion. For much of the
nation’s history until the 1970s, however, important aspects of that
discretion rested in the hands of judges. As late as 1970, the standard
sentencing practice placed significant power in judges to impose a
punishment they deemed appropriate to the offense. 248 Such
“indeterminate sentencing” regimes placed enormous responsibility
on judges that suggested a deep commitment to the notion that
judges, as formally neutral actors in the criminal justice system, were
well-positioned to assess the severity of a convicted individual’s
conduct and devise a fitting sanction. 249
The criminal justice landscape, however, did not remain the
same. The “war on crime” was well underway by the early 1970s and
the “war on drugs” burst onto the political scene as well as the
criminal justice system in the 1980s. 250 With their stark rhetoric
248. See id. at 60. In Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s words, indeterminate sentencing
schemes afforded judges “virtually unfettered discretion to sentence defendants to prison terms
falling anywhere within the statutory range.” Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 315
(O’Connor, J., dissenting). Parole boards also received considerable discretion in situations
involving individuals sentenced to imprisonment. Victoria J. Palacios, Go and Sin No More:
Rationality and Release Decisions by Parole Boards, 45 S.C. L. REV. 567, 573 (1994).
249. See Gilles R. Bissonnette, Comment, “Consulting” the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
After Booker, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1497, 1502 (2006) (explaining that the federal indeterminate
sentencing “system gave federal judges wide discretion by allowing them to determine ‘the
goals of sentencing, the factors to be considered, and how much weight to accord [certain]
factors, as well as the ultimate punishment’”) (citation omitted).
250. See James Vorenberg, The War on Crime: The First Five Years, ATLANTIC MONTHLY
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harkening to images of enemies and selfless warriors, the “wars”
pitted the law-abiding public against the criminals. As James
Vorenberg, an influential voice in criminal justice reforms in the late
1960s, explained in a 1972 essay, “self-protection has become the
dominant concern of those in our cities and suburbs.” 251 Clearly, the
battle lines were drawn.
In this arrangement of forces there was no room for neutrality. 252
The trust in neutral judges dissipated quite suddenly beginning in
the 1970s. 253 Rather than continue to confide in the neutral role that
judges are supposed to occupy, over the next two decades
policymakers began to portray judges as “betrayers of the common
good.” 254 As the hallmark of the judicial role, neutrality became the
downfall of judicial discretion. Judges, it was commonly thought,
failed to punish as severely as the circumstances called for. 255 In
doing so, they came to be viewed as unreliable partners in the wars
being waged in defense of law abiders everywhere. 256 Because the
dominant trope of the period—the notion that the nation was
engaged in a war against a dangerous underclass—left no room for
ambiguity about which side anyone was on, judges’ perceived failure
to vigorously fight crime meant they became associated with the
criminals rather than the victims. As Jonathan Simon explained, “the
judge remains a figure of suspicion, a person with a propensity to
violate public safety, little different in public confidence from the
figure of the criminal before them.” 257

(May 1972), www.theatlantic.com/past/politics/crime/crimewar.htm (reviewing the
successes and failures, as he saw them, of the first five years of the war on crime).
251. Id. Vorenberg served as executive director of a commission appointed by President
Johnson to study crime in the United States. See William Glaberson, James Vorenberg,
Watergate Prosecutor’s Right-Hand Man, Dies at 72, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2000, at C21.
252. See SIMON, GOVERNING, supra note 220, at 112.
253. See id. at 102 (noting that states began to limit judicial discretion in the 1970s); id.
at 128 (noting that the legislators in the 1980s viewed federal judges with “deep suspicion”).
254. See id. at 113.
255. See ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN
PROSECUTOR 7 (2007); SIMON, GOVERNING, supra note 220, at 113–14.
256. See SIMON, GOVERNING, supra note 220, at 116. Simon notes that judges were
attacked for three reasons: Supreme Court opinions restricting arrests, interrogations, and
searches, judicial abolishment of the death penalty, and judges’ use of discretion in sentencing.
Id. at 114.
257. See id. at 129–30.
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In response, legislators at the state and national level turned to
sentencing schemes that removed discretion from judges’ hands.
Congress, for example, enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
that established the United States Sentencing Commission. 258 The
Commission, in turn, issued sentencing guidelines that for more
than two decades were binding on federal judges. 259 Meanwhile,
Congress and state legislators enacted an array of “mandatory
[minimum] sentences that did not allow for the individualization of
sentences but required the imposition of a specific prison sentence
following the commission of a specific offense, generally a drug or
weapons crime.” 260 Eventually, Congress provided financial
incentives for states to enact “truth in sentencing” laws that required
convicted individuals to serve at least eighty-five percent of their
sentence, rather than being let out early on parole. 261 The idea was
to promote greater sentencing uniformity while also reducing the
likelihood that judges would issue sentences deemed too lenient or
that parole boards would release convicted individuals. 262
Though judges came to be viewed as undeserving of the
discretion they had long been assigned as part of criminal
proceedings, discretion did not end. It remained a core feature of the
criminal justice system. 263 Rather than remain concentrated in
judges, however, discretion was increasingly granted to

258. See DAVIS, supra note 255, at 103.
259. See id. at 103–04; see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 249–50 (2005)
(holding that the Sentencing Guidelines were not binding on federal judges). Justice Stephen
Breyer, then Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, wrote that the
Sentencing Guidelines were promulgated in order to promote “honesty in sentencing” and
“reduce unjustifiably wide sentencing disparity.” Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing
Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4 (1988)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
260. Nora V. Demleitner, Immigration Threats and Rewards: Effective Law Enforcement
Tools in the “War” on Terrorism?, 51 EMORY L.J. 1059, 1090–91 (2002).
261. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§§ 20101(b), 20102(a), 108 Stat. 1796, 1815; see PAULA M. DITTON & DORIS JAMES
WILSON, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TRUTH IN SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS 3 (1999), available
at http://bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/tssp.pdf.
262. See SIMON, GOVERNING, supra note 220, at 141 (“In varying degrees, virtually all
the states in the United States have reoriented their penal systems toward more uniform
application of prison sentences.”); id. at 102 (“A number of states abolished parole and
introduced legislatively determined sentencing ranges that limited the discretion of judges. The
federal system followed in 1987.”).
263. See DAVIS, supra note 255, at 6.
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prosecutors. 264 As decidedly biased actors in the criminal process,
prosecutors were viewed as counterweights to criminals and the
judges who had come to be cast as their allies. 265 The sentencing
reforms that took hold in the 1970s and 1980s, imposing mandatory
minimums and truth-in-sentencing, meant that prosecutors wielded
much more influence over outcomes in choosing the charges to
bring. 266 Now they could use the threat of significant prison time as
leverage against defendants. 267 That is, prosecutors could increase the
likelihood that a defendant would see the inside of a prison for some
amount of time simply by threatening a prosecution for one or more
offenses that promised more imprisonment. 268 In effect, prosecutors
became the “clearly dominant force” in late twentieth century
governmental responses to crime. 269
Added to these changes in the roles of judges and prosecutors
were new developments in policing norms. Law enforcement
agencies across the country turned to severe, paramilitary policing
practices. 270 Military-style patrols became commonplace. 271 Police

264. See id. at 56; SIMON, GOVERNING, supra note 220, at 43.
265. See SIMON, GOVERNING, supra note 220, at 130; see also STUNTZ, supra note 136,
at 88 (explaining that the introduction of government salaries and elections into the selection
of prosecutors turned them into judgmental actors subject to political pressures).
266. See SIMON, GOVERNING, supra note 220, at 102.
267. See DAVIS, supra note 255, at 57–58. William Stuntz explains how severe federal
sentences affect state prosecutions: “Defendants agree to harsher sentences in state court for
fear of what might happen to them in federal court. Federal law acts as an unfunded mandate,
raising state sentencing levels without paying for the increase.” STUNTZ, supra note 136, at 306.
268. See DAVIS, supra note 255, at 105; see also JOHN F. PFAFF, THE CAUSES OF
GROWTH IN PRISON ADMISSIONS AND POPULATIONS 7 (2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1884674 (“[C]hanging decisions in prosecutors’ offices about
when to file charges appear to be the primary—at times, seemingly almost the sole—driver of
prison growth, at least since the mid-to late-1980s.”). Angela J. Davis explains that prosecutors
frequently overcharge defendants—that is, they “‘tack[] on’ additional charges that they know
they cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt or that they can technically prove but are
inconsistent with the legislative intent or otherwise inappropriate.” DAVIS, supra note 255, at
31. They do this, she adds, because it provides them an advantage during plea negotiations and
presents a back-up offense in the event the principal charge does not result in a conviction. Id.
269. SIMON, GOVERNING, supra note 220, at 41–42.
270. See GARLAND, supra note 219, at 177 (noting that law enforcement agencies
incorporated technology that was advanced for the period, adopted widespread use of
automobiles and communications equipment, and embraced “more reactive styles of ‘911’
policing”).
271. See Karan R. Singh, Note, Treading the Thin Blue Line: Military Special-Operations
Trained Police SWAT Teams and the Constitution, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 673, 675–81
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officers shifted their attention away from developing close
relationships with community members to becoming an omnipresent
but arms-length presence, especially in neighborhoods filled with
poor people and people of color. 272 Meanwhile, prisons met the goal
of flexing the government’s power and reassuring the public that the
threat of criminal victimization was being attacked at its roots: by
segregating the perpetrators. 273 Moreover, the prisons deal with
wrongdoers the only way that is rational to deal with people who
cannot be reformed—incapacitation. Prison walls are easily
perceptible and prison population counts an easily reportable
statistic. And in the years since the 1970s there has been no shortage
of eye-catching statistics to report about the number of people
removed from the streets. 274 For some fifty years prior to 1973, there
were approximately 110 state and federal prisoners per 100,000
residents. 275 Growing at a rate of about 6.3% annually, by 1997 that
number had jumped to 445 per 100,000 residents. 276 This has been
especially true of incarceration related to drug offenses. Between
1980 and 1996, the incarceration rate for drug crimes went from
fewer than fifteen inmates per 100,000 adults in the nation’s
population to 148 inmates per 100,000. 277 There were more people
in prison for drug crimes in 1996 per 100,000 people, therefore,
than there were for all crimes in the half-century prior to 1973. 278

(2001) (describing the creation of special weapons and tactics (SWAT) and similar units in
police departments in the late 1960s and 1970s); Amanda M. Yeaples-Coleman, Comment,
Reviving the Knock and Announce Rule and Constructively Abolishing No-Knock Entries by
Giving the People a Ground They Can Stand On, 37 U. DAYTON L. REV. 381, 388 (2012)
(explaining that there was a 538% increase in the use of SWAT teams between 1980 and
1995).
272. See GARLAND, supra note 219, at 114.
273. See SIMON, GOVERNING, supra note 220, at 157 (explaining that prisons are
intended to assuage the public’s feelings of insecurity). Importantly, changes in the
imprisonment rate are not closely related to changes in crime rates. David Jacobs & Aubrey L.
Jackson, On the Politics of Imprisonments: A Review of Systematic Findings, 6 ANN. REV. SOC.
SCI. 129, 131 (2010).
274. For an eye-catching graphical display of incarceration rates from 1920 to 1997, see
Alfred Blumstein & Allen J. Beck, Population Growth in U.S. Prisons, 1980–1996, 26 CRIME &
JUST. 17, 19 fig.1 (1999).
275. See id. at 17–18.
276. See id. at 18.
277. See id. at 21 & fig.2.
278. See id. at 21.
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This evolution in policing norms affected communities of color
most poignantly. For one thing, community relations with police
officers all but collapsed in many urban areas. Black victims of crime
struggled to receive police assistance while black residents were
frequently, almost reflexively, perceived as perpetrators of crime. 279
Moreover, imprisonment rates skyrocketed, especially among young
black men convicted of drug crimes. 280 By 1996 more than eight
percent of black men in their late twenties were in prison. 281 There is
now a greater likelihood that young black men will spend time in a
jail or prison than at any other time in United States history. 282 As
Michelle Alexander has carefully documented, incarceration has
effectively removed massive numbers of black men from community
life in much the same way that Jim Crow did prior to the civil rights
movement. 283 Imprisonment essentially became a rite of passage for
many young black men. 284
Latinos also felt the brunt of imprisonment policy. Indeed,
between 1980 and 1996 there was a 554% growth in the number of
Latinos in a state or federal prison who were sentenced to a year or
more. 285 Putting this another way, the number of Latino prisoners
per 100,000 United States residents in 1980 was 206; in 1996, that
number hit 690. 286
In sum, the 1960s through the 1990s witnessed sea changes in
acceptable modes of discourse and significant changes in the
substantive law regulating immigration and crime. Instead of
employing overtly racist means of subjugating entire classes of
nonwhite people, policymakers embraced the formal equality of

279. See STUNTZ, supra note 136, at 22 (noting that “[c]rime victims in black
neighborhoods have difficulty convincing local police to take their victimization seriously”).
280. See MAUER, supra note 222, at 143–44 & 153 tbl.8-1; see also Blumstein & Beck,
supra note 274, at 22 (noting that “[t]he growth in incarceration has been greater for women
and minorities than for men and whites” between 1980 and 1996, but that female prisoners
only comprised 6.1% of the prison population in 1996). Mauer reports that the arrest rate for
black men suspected of drug activity also increased significantly. MAUER, supra note 222, at
146 fig.8-2.
281. See Blumstein & Beck, supra note 274, at 23.
282. ANGELA J. HATTERY & EARL SMITH, AFRICAN AMERICAN FAMILIES 240 (2007).
283. See ALEXANDER, supra note 216, at 2–4.
284. See STUNTZ, supra note 136, at 34.
285. See Blumstein & Beck, supra note 274, at 22 tbl.1.
286. See id.
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crime control as a depoliticized marker of undesirability. It was only
a matter of time, as Part IV explains, before these trends would
create crimmigration law.
IV. CRIMMIGRATION IS MADE
The moment in which events converged to produce
crimmigration came in the 1980s and 1990s. Much of Latin America
was unstable—México’s economy had plummeted, Central America
was being ravaged by civil wars, the Caribbean continued to suffer
immense poverty, and South America’s booming export to the
United States was of the illicit variety, cocaine. Since the civil rights
movement had rendered it culturally and politically infeasible to
enact blatantly racist immigration policies similar to those adopted in
past generations, policymakers sought a different method of
regulating immigrants. The new willingness to punish that was
sweeping criminal law and procedure soon reached immigration law.
Instead of adopting explicitly race-based considerations to keep out
entire racial groups as was frequently done prior to the civil rights
movement, Congress and multiple presidential administrations
enacted increasingly strict immigration laws that emphasized a
noncitizen’s involvement in criminal activity. Investigations of
potential immigration law violations began to resemble criminal
policing operations, and decisions about who to admit into or deport
from the United States more and more often turned on criminal
histories. Despite the facial neutrality of these enactments, however,
the people most adversely affected were nonwhite newcomers just as
was often the case prior to the civil rights era. In the post-civil rights
period, crime effectively became a proxy for race.
A. Rekindling the Fear of Immigrants
A series of high profile and politically fraught events sparked a
newfound concern about foreigners in the 1980s. Caribbean and
Central American migrants were streaming into the United States
without permission, and the federal government, it seemed, had no
way of keeping up. 287 It was simply outmatched. Upwards of

287. See Jonathan Simon, Refugees in a Carceral Age: The Rebirth of Immigration Prisons
in the United States, 10 PUB. CULTURE 577, 579, 582–83 (1998); [hereinafter Simon,
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125,000 Cubans who left the island’s port of Mariel in 1979 and
1980 reached Miami’s coast. 288 Another 15,000 or so Haitians
braved Caribbean waters to arrive in the United States. 289 Neither
group was welcomed. The Cubans—pejoratively described as
“marielitos”—were depicted as common criminals, with U.S. News
& World Report going so far as to publish a special report titled
“Castro’s ‘Crime Bomb’ Inside U.S.” 290 Haitians, meanwhile, were
associated with crime, in particular drug activity, and at times
described as coming to take advantage of United States social welfare
largess. 291 During this same time, along the land border with
México, Central Americans made their way into the United States
clandestinely. 292
By the early 1980s the number of unauthorized immigrants
living in the United States had caught the attention of federal
policymakers and they began formulating potential legislative
responses. In 1980, for example, Ronald Reagan, then a presidential
candidate, rejected the idea of building a wall between México and

Refugees]; see also TIMOTHY J. DUNN, THE MILITARIZATION OF THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER,
1978–1992: LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT DOCTRINE COMES HOME 160 (1996) [hereinafter
DUNN, MILITARIZATION] (discussing the Reagan Administration’s punitive reaction to
Central American migrants); Stephanie J. Silverman, Immigration Detention in America: A
History of its Expansion and a Study of its Significance 9 (Univ. of Oxford, Working Paper No.
80, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1867366 (discussing a “panic among the
American public” caused by Cuban migration in the early 1980s).
288. JOSEPH NEVINS, OPERATION GATEKEEPER AND BEYOND: THE WAR ON
“ILLEGALS,” AND THE REMAKING OF THE U.S.-MEXICO BOUNDARY 82–83 (2d ed. 2010).
289. See Simon, Refugees, supra note 287, at 579.
290. John S. Lang, Castro’s “Crime Bomb” Inside U.S., U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan.
16, 1984, at 27, 27; see JORGE DUANY, BLURRED BORDERS: TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION
BETWEEN THE HISPANIC CARIBBEAN AND THE UNITED STATES 45, 140 (2011). According to
Duany, “[c]ontrary to media reports, less than 2 percent of the Marielitos were common
criminals, though 25 percent had been imprisoned for various reasons, including ideological
differences with the Cuban government and ‘antisocial’ behavior such as public displays of
homosexuality.” Id.
291. See Simon, Refugees, supra note 287, at 593; Teresa A. Miller, The Impact of Mass
Incarceration on Immigration Policy, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 214, 226, 232 (Marc Mauer & Meda ChesneyLind eds., 2002) [hereinafter Miller, Impact].
292. See Nora Hamilton & Norma Stoltz Chincilla, Central American Migration: A
Framework for Analysis, in NEW AMERICAN DESTINIES: A READER IN CONTEMPORARY ASIAN
AND LATINO IMMIGRATION 91, 109–10 (Darrell Y. Hamamoto & Rodolfo D. Torres eds.,
1997); see also DUNN, MILITARIZATION, supra note 287, at 46, 160 (describing the U.S.
government’s treatment of Central Americans in the early 1980s).
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the United States. 293 His opponent for the Republican presidential
nomination, the future president George H.W. Bush, acknowledged
“the illegal alien problem” before taking a position that, much like
Reagan’s, seems quaint to contemporary ears—“the problem,” he
claimed, “is we are making illegal the labor that I’d like to see
legal.” 294 Four years later, in a debate against Democratic opponent
Walter Mondale, President Reagan expressed his belief that “our
borders are out of control” and his support for “an immigration bill
that will give us, once again, control of our borders.” 295 Clearly the
pressure was on policymakers to do something about what had come
to be seen as an urgent problem. 296 Within two years, Congress
would do just that, sending President Reagan a wide-ranging
immigration bill that he signed into law.
As had occurred many times before, numerous policy initiatives
implemented as early as 1980 took a decisively derisive position
toward foreigners. Instead of simply identifying people to exclude or
deport based on racial categorizations, this time immigration law
turned on a noncitizen’s involvement in the nation’s alarm du jour:
crime, specifically drug-related activity. Haitians were quickly
racialized as African-American meaning that the concerns policy
makers had with drug activity in black communities was easily
imputed onto these new arrivals. 297 Much the same happened with
the Cubans who left the island from the port of Mariel. 298 Unlike
earlier Cuban emigrants, roughly half of the Mariel Cubans were
black and many were low-skilled laborers. 299 After “INS officials . . .
began to notice Cuban men who were ‘more hardened and rougher

293. Robert Guest, Foreword to PILAR MARRERO, KILLING THE AMERICAN DREAM:
HOW ANTI-IMMIGRATION EXTREMISTS ARE DESTROYING THE NATION, at xii–xiii (2012).
294. PILAR MARRERO, KILLING THE AMERICAN DREAM: HOW ANTI-IMMIGRATION
EXTREMISTS ARE DESTROYING THE NATION 14–15 (2012).
295. 1984—Ronald
Reagan
on
Amnesty,
YOUTUBE.COM,
http://www.youtube.com/watch? v=JfHKIq5z80U (last visited Sept. 16, 2013).
296. See Oscar J. Martinez, Migration and the Border, 1965–1985, in BEYOND LA
FRONTERA: THE HISTORY OF MEXICO-U.S. MIGRATION, supra note 204, at 103, 111.
William Colby, who led the Central Intelligence Agency in the 1970s, claimed that
unauthorized Mexican immigrants posed a greater danger to the United States than the Soviet
Union. NEVINS, supra note 288, at 79.
297. Miller, Impact, supra note 291, at 232; see Simon, Refugees, supra note 287 at 593–94.
298. See Silverman, supra note 287, at 9.
299. See MARK S. HAMM, THE ABANDONED ONES: THE IMPRISONMENT AND UPRISING
OF THE MARIEL BOAT PEOPLE 75 (1995). Interestingly, Duany reports that only twenty
percent or so self-identified as black. Duany, supra note 290, at 45.
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in appearance’ than earlier arrivals . . . the INS concluded that the
Cuban government was taking advantage of the immigration accords
[signed by the United States and Cuba] by emptying the nation’s
prison system of hard-core criminals.” 300 The White House agreed
with the INS’s assessment and soon news reports appeared repeating
these claims. 301 It eventually would become clear that these claims
were exaggerated, but by then “marielito” had become synonymous
with dangerousness. 302
Additionally, though cross-border smuggling has been part of
border life in the Southwest as long as it has constituted an
international boundary, 303 the newfound concern about drug
trafficking brought law enforcement attention to the southern
border not seen since the days when a German invasion was thought
possible. The Soviet-aligned Sandinistas, President Reagan
commented in a reference to the putatively socialist government of
Nicaragua, are only a two-day’s drive from Texas. 304 Meanwhile,
drugs that had previously been routed through the Caribbean began
making their way into the United States across the Mexican
border. 305 The México-United States border had become, as one
Border Patrol officer put it, “a ‘danger zone . . . a war zone, if you
will.’” 306 Clandestine entrants and drug traffickers became
indistinguishable, 307 and both were “enemies” of a sort. 308 Some
policymakers described unauthorized immigration as an
“invasion.” 309 This narrative claimed that the border was “out of
control” and “migrant workers from Mexico became increasingly
associated with drug trafficking.” 310 For the Reagan Administration,
clandestine immigration and cross-border drug trafficking dovetailed

300. HAMM, supra note 299, at 51.
301. See id. at 51–52.
302. See id. at 58, 76.
303. TONY PAYAN, THE THREE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER WARS: DRUGS, IMMIGRATION,
AND HOMELAND SECURITY 18 (2006).
304. DUNN, MILITARIZATION, supra note 287, at 3; see Eleanor Clift, Lambastes “Liberals”
as Helping to Create Deficits: Reagan Uses Tough Tone on Trail, L.A. TIMES, July 24, 1986.
305. PAYAN, supra note 303, at 12; see NEVINS, supra note 288.
306. DUNN, MILITARIZATION, supra note 287, at 87; see PAYAN, supra note 303, at xii.
307. DUNN, MILITARIZATION, supra note 287, at 87.
308. Id. at 162–63.
309. See NEVINS, supra note 288, at 79.
310. Id. at 97.
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to make border security a national security issue. 311 By 1990, drugs
had become so intertwined with concerns about cross-border
movement that President George H.W. Bush described the border as
“the front lines of the war on drugs.” 312
Just as nonwhite foreigners had been deemed a menace prior to
the civil rights movement, immigrants in the closing quarter of the
twentieth century were viewed derisively. Only now the blatant racial
animus of a prior era gave way to facially neutral concerns about
immigrants’ role in criminal activity, especially related to drugs.
Combined with the newfound but profound concern about drug
activity, unauthorized immigration became a security issue. 313 The
“criminal alien,” it was thought, was a “dangerous class” present
everywhere—always lurking in wait for an opportunity to wreak
havoc on United States communities. 314 It was easy, then, to attack
immigrants as threatening individual residents of the United States
and the nation as a whole. 315
B. Activating Penal Power
The public policy response to immigration and cross-border drug
trafficking was identical: flex the state’s penal power. 316 “Policing
became the new way of dealing with any issues along the border.” 317
The political rhetoric along with the law enforcement strategies,
tactics, personnel, and financial and hardware resources that
launched and sustained the war on drugs were reemployed along the
311. DUNN, MILITARIZATION, supra note 287, at 42.
312. George H.W. Bush, Presidential Statement on Signing the Immigration Act of 1990
(Nov. 29, 1990), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=19117#axzz1OsUYZ1gw.
313. See Miller, Citizenship, supra note 215, at 625; see also Marc R. Rosenblum,
Immigration and U.S. National Interests: Historical Cases and the Contemporary Debate, in
IMMIGRATION POLICY AND SECURITY: U.S., EUROPEAN, AND COMMONWEALTH
PERSPECTIVES 13, 14 (Terri E. Givens et al. eds., 2009) (“Thus, while most migratory flows
are not threatening to security, migration control becomes a legitimate security concern when
unwanted immigration overlaps with or reinforces other security threats.”).
314. See Miller, Citizenship, supra note 215, at 646.
315. Alex M. Saragoza, Cultural Representation and Mexican Immigration, in BEYOND
LA FRONTERA: THE HISTORY OF MEXICO-U.S. MIGRATION, supra note 198, at 227, 235–36
(explaining that unauthorized Mexican immigrants in the 1980s were viewed as potential drug
traffickers while also “trampl[ing] with impunity on the sovereignty of the United States”).
316. See DUNN, MILITARIZATION, supra note 287, at 104 (“[I]mmigration and drug
enforcement efforts often overlapped.”).
317. PAYAN, supra note 303, at 12.
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border. This new emphasis on curtailing clandestine entry by people
and drugs neatly matched trends in criminal policing. 318 The goal
was to “regain control” of cross-border traffic, and the government’s
full array of resources was put into action. 319
As in the criminal context, police and prosecutors occupied the
first line of attack. Law enforcement agencies suddenly found
themselves adding new types of border-related work to their
portfolios. INS officers, for example, became involved in drugrelated enforcement activities in the mid-1980s, often alongside
criminal law enforcement agencies. 320 Importantly, the agency also
had more money and officers to devote to its growing concerns—
between 1980 and 1988 the INS’s congressionally appropriated
funding increased 130% and staff grew by 41%. 321 One of its units,
the Border Patrol, developed a host of antidrug initiatives to
augment its traditional focus on clandestine immigration, including
controversial patrols near El Paso public schools. 322 Indeed,
beginning in 1989, the INS claimed “that the Border Patrol had
primary responsibility among federal agencies for drug interdiction
between official ports of entry along the U.S.-México border.” 323
The agency soon obtained power to enforce federal drug laws. 324
Two years later, in 1991, this became the Bush Administration’s
official policy. 325 To adequately complete its drug-fighting mission,
318. See id. at xiv (describing border security policies as containing “all the elements of a
war . . . the strategy, the tactics, the personnel, the resources, the rhetoric, and the hardware,
etc.”); see also NEVINS, supra note 288, at 5 (describing Border Patrol expansions in the early
and mid-1990s as war-like strategies).
319. See PAYAN, supra note 303, at 114.
320. See Criminal Aliens: INS Enforcement: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Immigr.,
Refugees, and Int’l L., Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 28 (1987), available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/150/145875.pdf.
321. NEVINS, supra note 288, at 84.
322. Id. at 85; see TIMOTHY J. DUNN, BLOCKADING THE BORDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
THE EL PASO OPERATION THAT REMADE IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 28 (2009)
[hereinafter Dunn, BLOCKADING].
323. DUNN, MILITARIZATION, supra note 287, at 80.
324. See Rebecca Bohrman & Naomi Murakawa, Remaking Big Government:
Immigration and Crime Control in the United States, in GLOBAL LOCKDOWN: RACE,
GENDER, AND THE PRISON-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 109, 116 (Julia Sudbury ed. 2005).
325. See Southwest Border Enforcement Affected by Mission Expansion and Budget,
Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Int’l L., Immig. & Refugees, H. Comm. of Judiciary, 102d
Cong. 1 (1991) (statement of Harold A. Valentine, Associate Director, Administration of
Justice Issues).
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the INS provided the Border Patrol with funding for new stations
and checkpoints. 326 These initiatives and funding priorities expanded
immigration officials’ focus to include anticrime policing in addition
to violations of immigration law. Thus, their law enforcement
concerns shifted. No longer tied to their historical concern about
undesirable racial groups, they now sorted noncitizens on the basis
of the facially neutral criminal label.
At the same time, the military became involved in immigration
regulation. Usually justified by a concern about keeping illicit drugs
out of the country, the military quickly took a role in enforcing
immigration law. The 1981 Military Cooperation with Law
Enforcement Officials Act, for example, authorized military
involvement in drug and immigration enforcement activities. 327
Separately, because Congress did not think the Border Patrol was up
to the task on its own, it “forced the military to aid the Border Patrol
in guarding the border” and soon provided approximately $1 billion
in funding for border-related drug activities. 328 With time the
military wound up playing a significant role in assisting to identify
and apprehend suspected clandestine entrants. 329 A secret National
Guard initiative launched in 1989, Operation Border Ranger II, for
example, deployed armed troops to the border to assist civilian law
enforcement agencies with drug and immigration enforcement
efforts by, among other things, informing INS agents about the
presence of suspected clandestine entrants. 330 The next year, a
Marine unit working alongside the Border Patrol in Texas and
Arizona utilized then-novel surveillance from an unmanned aerial
vehicle (a “drone”). 331 This helped the Border Patrol double the
number of clandestine entrants it usually identified, while also
confiscating marijuana shipments. 332

326. NEVINS, supra note 288, at 85.
327. Candidus Dougherty, While the Government Fiddled Around, the Big Easy Drowned:
How the Posse Comitatus Act Became the Government’s Alibi for the Hurricane Katrina Disaster,
29 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 117, 131 (2008). This authority was expanded in 1988. DUNN,
MILITARIZATION, supra note 287, at 117.
328. PAYAN, supra note 303, at 79.
329. See DUNN, BLOCKADING, supra note 322, at 181 (2009).
330. DUNN, MILITARIZATION, supra note 287, at 128.
331. Id. at 132.
332. Id.
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That same year, the military created Joint Task Force-6 (“JTF6”), an initiative intended to coordinate military support of civilian
law enforcement agencies along the border as well as in Houston and
Los Angeles, two large interior metropolitan areas with large
immigrant communities. 333 Involving at least 500 troops—including
Army Rangers and Green Berets—JTF-6 primarily assisted Border
Patrol agents with their drug-fighting duties. 334 Importantly, though
JTF-6 personnel were ostensibly deployed to support law
enforcement officers and not to enforce laws themselves, they were
nonetheless authorized to shoot to kill if military or civilian law
enforcement personnel were endangered—a far cry from the longstanding practice of prohibiting the military from engaging in
domestic law enforcement practices. 335 This power proved fateful in
1997 when Marines participating in a JTF-6 operation shot and
killed Ezekiel Hernández, Jr., an eighteen-year-old United States
citizen who was tending his family’s livestock when the troops
mistook him for a drug trafficker. 336 Though JTF-6 was later
disbanded, its successors continue to be deployed to the border
ostensibly to assist with antidrug efforts while also engaging in
immigration law enforcement. Joint Task Force-North, for example,
“assisted in the apprehension of 3,865 undocumented aliens” in
fiscal year 2010, 337 while its manned aerial support program
“[a]ssisted in the apprehension of 6,500-8,000 undocumented
aliens” during fiscal year 2011. 338 The military’s involvement in
routine immigration law enforcement actions suggests the antidrug
rationale is paperthin. It is instead a politically acceptable route by

333. See id. at 133–34.
334. See id. at 137.
335. Id.; see United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916, 925 (D.S.D. 1975)
(holding that the Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385, “makes unlawful the use of federal
military troops in an active role of direct law enforcement by civil law enforcement officers”).
336. JUSTIN AKERS CHACÓN & MIKE DAVIS, NO ONE IS ILLEGAL: FIGHTING RACISM
AND STATE VIOLENCE ON THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER 208 (2006).
337. Memorandum from David M. D’Agostino, Dir., Def. Capabilities & Mgmt., U.S.
Gov’t Accountability Office, to Senator Carl Levin, Chairman, U.S. Senate Comm. on Armed
Servs., Observations on the Costs and Benefits of an Increased Department of Defense Role in
Helping to Secure the Southwest Land Border 21 (Sept. 12, 2011).
338. Id. at 32. Two other recent Defense Department antidrug initiatives, Operation
Jump Start and Operation Phalanx, also put military personnel in a position to assist with the
apprehension of large numbers of unauthorized immigrants. See id. at 16–17.
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which to justify heavy-handed securitization measures along the
border in an era when it is not acceptable to do so on the basis of the
racialized markers used in the past.
The policing build-up meant that governmental agencies were
apprehending more people suspected of being in the country
without permission. To accommodate this, immigration officials
adopted a tactic newly en vogue in criminal policing: drastically
expanding the government’s detention capabilities. Prior to 1980,
immigration detention was the exception. 339 That twenty–five year
norm suddenly changed within the span of a few years in the early
1980s—all the time that the INS needed to ramp up its bed space.
The agency built its own facilities and contracted with private
corporations to boost its detention capacity from approximately
1,720 beds in 1982 to roughly 7,439 in 1988, including 4,200 in
private facilities. 340 In the Lower Río Grande Valley of South Texas,
the INS began to detain every asylum applicant, and prepared to run
what it called a “federal reservation.” 341 Detention was so
commonplace in this region that one commentator described it as
“virtually a ‘detention zone’ during much of the 1980s for Central
Americans.” 342
In other parts of the country, Cubans and Haitians were
subjected to similar treatment. The INS set up temporary detention
facilities and rented space in a federal prison to house unauthorized
Cubans, 343 and in 1982 President Reagan ordered the mandatory
detention of clandestinely arriving Haitians. 344 A more permanent
solution soon followed in the form of the Krome Avenue Detention
Center, a facility that the INS quickly opened in Miami to house
Cuban and Haitian noncitizens and that still exists solely to house
immigration detainees. 345 Though not described as a jail or prison, it
339. See DOW, supra note 51, at 7; Miller, Impact, supra note 291, at 214; Miller,
Citizenship, supra note 215, at 611, 640.
340. See DUNN, MILITARIZATION, supra note 287, at 47–48.
341. See id. at 91–92.
342. Id. at 75.
343. See Silverman, supra note 287, at 9.
344. Id. at 10.
345. SIMON, GOVERNING, supra note 220, at 379; see Simon, Refugees, supra note 287,
at 579; U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, MIAMI FIELD OFFICE, KROME
SERVICE
PROCESSING
CENTER
FACT
SHEET,
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/dro/facilities/pdf/kro.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2013).
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had many features of these secure environments: fencing, armed
guards, orange jumpsuits for inmates, and more. 346 In the 1990s,
Krome would gain notoriety as the site of guard-on-inmate abuse. 347
Within a few years, the immigration detention practice would
shift from its early focus on Central American and Caribbean
refugees, frequently perceived to be involved in criminal activity, to
an explicit emphasis on people suspected of having engaged in
criminal activity, often drug-related activity. 348 The Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 1986, for example, granted the INS the power to issue a
“detainer to detain” any person arrested for having violated a
controlled-substances offense. 349 Its 1988 counterpart likewise
turned the INS’s detention policy toward so-called “criminal aliens”
by adding the “aggravated felony” basis of deportation to the INA,
defining it narrowly to include only drug trafficking and two other
crimes, murder and firearms trafficking, and requiring that the INS
take into custody noncitizens convicted of an aggravated felony. 350
Immigration policy has not shifted from this focus since then. In
fact, the emphasis on crime and the use of criminal policing tactics
has only increased in the intervening years. Today’s norms arise from
the practices implemented in the 1980s and early 1990s when the
federal government unleashed its policing authority along the border
to regulate the flow of people and illicit drugs. Immigration agents
were tasked with stopping drug crimes, and the military was
employed to identify and apprehend immigration law violators.
Doing this set the stage for crimmigration law’s creation.

346. See Dow, supra note 51, at 56; MICHAEL WELCH, DETAINED: IMMIGRATION LAWS
116–17 (2002).
347. See DOW, supra note 51, at 56–57; WELCH, supra note 346, at 123.
348. See DUNN, MILITARIZATION, supra note 287, at 72–73.
349. Anti-Drug Abuse Act, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1751(d), 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-47
(1986) (amending INA § 287, 8 U.S.C. § 1357). For a more detailed discussion of
immigration detainers, see Christopher Lasch, Enforcing the Limits of the Executive’s Authority
to Issue Immigration Detainers, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 164, 183 (2008).
350. See, e.g., Anti-Drug Abuse Act, Pub. L. No. 100-690, §§ 7342, 7343, 102 Stat.
4181, 4469-70 (1988) (amending INA § 101(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) and § 242(a), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a) respectively).
AND THE EXPANDING I.N.S. JAIL COMPLEX
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C. Merging Criminal Law and Immigration Law
The convergence of criminal and immigration law did not occur
coincidentally or accidentally. Rather, it was a logical progression of
deliberate choices. The state’s penal authority came to be seen in the
1980s as the law-abiding public’s last hope to stem the tide of
criminality taking the country by storm.
Immigration law was not immune to these trends. The rise in
unauthorized immigration that occurred during the last three
decades of the twentieth century was represented rhetorically as a
threat to the nation’s very existence. The argument held that the
country’s sovereignty could mean little if the government and the
public to which it responded did not know who was crossing its
borders. 351 Worse yet, unauthorized migrants arrived in a country
struggling with the legacy of overt racism that in the post-civil rights
era had nowhere to easily escape. Mostly racialized as nonwhite
(Asian, black, and Latino), the new arrivals were saddled with the
burden of domestic and international political tension. The Cubans
were deemed criminals, the Haitians linked to African-American
drug activity, the Central Americans depicted as the vanguard of a
communist threat flouting the United States’ sovereignty and laws
regulating cross-border movement, and the Mexicans as willing
accomplices to Colombian drug trafficking. No matter the
particulars, in an era when overt racism was no longer tolerated, all
were deemed dangerous because of their association with illegal
conduct and therefore unwanted.
And as with the criminal justice system’s response to drug
activity, the immigration law system responded with strong-armed
policing and imprisonment strategies. Immigration in violation of
the law, traditionally a civil infraction, increasingly came within the
province of criminal justice system actors. Even minor criminal
convictions of noncitizens that previously had no immigration
consequence became likely to result in removal. Immigration
policing agents broadened their investigative techniques to more
closely resemble criminal law enforcement officers—including sting

351. See Rosenblum, supra note 313, at 14.
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operations reminiscent of antidrug initiatives. 352 They boosted their
armaments and even joined forces with the military. Meanwhile,
prisons simultaneously became the symbol of chaos and order. If
they exist, the public discourse suggests, it is because a threat
lurks. 353 The government likewise uses the existence of prisons to
demonstrate that it is doing something about that danger. 354 In the
immigration context of the 1980s and 1990s, the people inside the
prison walls were framed as dangerous outsiders who did not deserve
the nation’s hospitality; their presence, quite simply, was not
desired. 355 Keeping them locked up provided those who were outside
with “a fake sense of security,” but a sense of security nonetheless. 356
The merger of criminal law and immigration law allowed for a
unified front against the threat ostensibly facing the law-abiding
public. Police agents of all variety were sent into the streets to watch,
identify, and apprehend outlaws of multiple sorts—selling drugs,
working without authorization, present without permission. Unlike
before, when undesirability was explicitly determined by race, in the
age of metaphorical wars against crime and drugs, undesirability
became pegged to criminality. In turn, criminality became tied,
implicitly, to race. Law enforcement agents were given the task of
physically removing from the body politic unwanted elements. 357
Given the nation’s appreciation of confinement, law enforcement
authorities were thought to be successful if the lawbreakers were in
the prisons, excluded from the law-abiding community and under
the government’s control. 358 In the age of crimmigration, police
authorities have done this with remarkable success, thereby providing

352. Miller, Citizenship, supra note 215, at 638.
353. See Stephanie J. Silverman, Return to the Isle of Man: The Implications of Internment
for Understanding Immigration Detention in the UK 13 (Univ. of Oxford, Working Paper No.
102, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2211336.
354. See Simon, Refugees, supra note 287, at 577, 603.
355. ALEXANDRA HALL, BORDER WATCH: CULTURES OF IMMIGRATION, DETENTION
AND CONTROL 2, 7 (2012) (positing that this is what occurs in the United Kingdom).
356. Inés Valdez, Sovereignty and the City: Raiding, Detaining, and Domestic
Immigration
Policing
2
(W.
Political
Sci.
Ass’n,
2010),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1580743.
357. See Bohrman & Murakawa, supra note 324, at 122–23.
358. See GARLAND, supra note 219, at 177 (noting that today prisons are “conceived
much more explicitly as a mechanism of exclusion and control”).
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the public with a sense of security. 359 In the battle against danger and
the fear of danger, the government, these tactics proclaim, finally has
the upper hand.
CONCLUSION
Crimmigration is now a defining feature of law enforcement in
the United States. To the tens of thousands of people who are
prosecuted criminally because of an alleged immigration law
violation (making this the largest category of offenses prosecuted in
federal courts during several recent years), and to the hundreds of
thousands who are imprisoned while immigration officials decide
whether they will be allowed to remain in the country (making ICE
the largest detention agency in the United States), criminal law is not
distinct from immigration law. The two are simply different ends of a
single punitive spectrum of governmental authority wielded over
their lives.
To understand why crimmigration law developed and where it
might head, it is necessary to understand its origins. This Article
charts that history. The cultural and legislative successes of the civil
rights era made it culturally, politically, and legally unacceptable or
impermissible to repeat the overt racism that dominated law and law
enforcement for much of the nation’s history. Those successes,
however, could not so easily preclude the widespread sentiment that
people of color were undesirable, indeed, dangerous. Consequently,
a punitive spirit took hold in the 1980s that continued the
marginalization of people of color, but did so through operation of
race-neutral criminal laws and practices. Immigration law soon
developed a statutory scheme that categorized newcomers based on
their interactions with the criminal justice system and borrowed
criminal policing’s ever harsher punitive bent—interactions that, it
unsurprisingly turned out, continued to weigh most heavily on
people of color.

359. See ANNA O. LAW, THE IMMIGRATION BATTLE IN AMERICAN COURTS 80 (2010)
(“The apprehension numbers, exacerbated by arrest quotas, demonstrate to the public that the
border enforcement strategies are working because the apprehension numbers represent illegal
aliens that would have infiltrated our border defenses had the border patrol and INS not
apprehended them.”).
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